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OFF-LABEL PROMOTION REFORM: A LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL ADDRESSING VULNERABLE PATIENT
DRUG ACCESS AND LIMITING INAPPROPRIATE
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING
Tim Mackey*
Bryan A. Liang**
Off-label promotion occurs when pharmaceuticalmanufacturers engage in promotion of unapproved or "off-label" uses of their drugs. These off label uses may lack
adequate clinical data to substantiate marketing claims, have led to corporate investigations and penalties, and can endanger public health. However there is
adequate evidence to suggest that off-label uses are entirely appropriatefor some
vulnerable patient populations, and that physicians have accepted such uses as
standard. Histoically, U.S. law has prohibited direct off-label promotion to physicians and patients. However failed government guidance, industry-based
litigation, and the diminished capacity of regulators to police illegal practiceshave
had dire consequences for patient safety and the prevention of healthcarefraud
and abuse. Worse still, because of these policies, vulnerable disease patients and
their physicians are often unaware of appropriateoff-label treatments, and the lack
of information places these patients at risk. To address these concerns, we propose
the creation of a targeted and regulated off-label promotion system that enables
vulnerable patient populationsto access life-saving treatments and simultaneously
creates clear incentives to avoid inappropriateoff-label promotion. This federal legislation would create FDA-targeted exemptions of off-label prohibitions for
vulnerable patient populations, if certain requirements of enrollment, risk management, and pharmacovigilanceare met. Any proposed off-label promotion would
also be pre-reviewed by the FDA to ensure that the program was safe and properly
monitored. To create incentives for appropriate off-label marketing and avoid the
problem of repeat corporate offenders, additionalpenalties would be available
without preemptingother causes of action. This system of carrots and sticks would
increase drug access for vulnerable patient populations while discouragingillegal
marketing that could threaten patient safety and public health.
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INTRODUCTION

The practice of promoting "off-label" use by pharmaceutical
manufacturers is defined as the promotion and marketing of
pharmaceutical indications that have not been approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). These "off-label promotions" are often not supported by adequate clinical data.
Though the FDA provides for a comprehensive review of new
pharmaceuticals before they obtain marketing approval, once they
are approved, physicians are free to prescribe them for any indication they see fit.2 This clinical practice, commonly referred to as
"off-label use" or "off-label prescribing," allows physicians to maintain autonomy in the practice of medicine, creating opportunities
in which pharmaceuticals can be prescribed for alternative uses
that may ultimately improve treatment.
Off-label use is common in medical practice. Studies report that
it accounts for roughly one of every five (21 percent) drug uses,
with a majority (73 percent) lacking evidence of clinical efficacy.
Indeed, the prevalence of off-label prescribing has been estimated
to be as high as 83 percent for certain kinds of drugs. In addition,
pharmaceutical marketing, estimated at some $29.9 billion in expenditures in 2005, continues to drive these forms of product
promotion to increase use and market share.
Off-label use and promotion are complex issues involving both
potential benefits and adverse consequences for clinical interventions. Inappropriate, or bad off-label promotion can create
difficulties in patient care and outcomes. This includes inducing
demand for inappropriate and dangerous drugs. However, appropriate, or good off-label promotion can potentially provide patient
advantages through clinical practice innovation, increased access

1.
See Bruce Psaty & Wayne Ray, FDA Guidance on Off Label Promotionand the State of the
LiteratureFrom Sponsors, 299J. Ams. MED. Ass'N 1949, 1949-50 (2008).
2.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (noting the government's intention not to interfere with health care providers' prescription of legally
marketed products for legitimate medical reasons).
3.
See David Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).

See id. at 1021, 1023 (finding high off-label prescription rates for drugs including
4.
gabapentin (83%), amitriptyline hydrochlorine (81%), and desamethasone (79%)).
See Julie Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
5.
Drugs, 357 NEw ENG.J. MED. 673, 675 (2007). Note that pharmaceutical marketing expenditure estimates vary based on data source and methodology and may suffer from
underreporting. See id. at 680. This has made it difficult to obtain accurate assessments of
pharmaceutical marketing expenditures given the lack of accurate and publicly accessible
data. See id.
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for vulnerable patient populations, and dissemination of valid
treatment options for underserved patients if used properly.6
However, current policy does not provide the appropriate incentive and disincentive mechanisms. Though existing laws penalize
inappropriate off-label marketing, repeat offenses by drug companies continue to occur. At the same time, vulnerable patients with
rare diseases and the physicians who treat them continue to lack
access to crucial information regarding treatment options. Existing
laws preclude the dissemination of this information even though
off-label use may be the only option for these patient populations.
To address these issues, this Article describes the current regulatory landscape of off-label promotion, its benefits and
disadvantages, enforcement actions, and potential policy solutions.
Part I examines the current regulatory structure of off-label promotion and marketing activities. Upon assessment, it is clear that
the current regulatory framework has been diminished by a history
of litigation limiting the scope and authority of potential surveillance and enforcement. In addition, regulation is insufficient to
properly identify and regulate off-label promotion and does not
provide adequate guidance to clinicians and the pharmaceutical
industry.
Part II of this Article explores the current debate over off-label
promotion in more detail. This examination reveals that off-label
use and promotion may improve both clinical care and access
to pharmaceuticals. However, it also reveals that off-label uses and
promotion may have negative consequences for patient safetypotentially endangering vulnerable populations, escalating
health-system costs, and heightening the risk of fraud and abuse.
Part III presents an empirical survey of efforts to stem inappropriate off-label marketing. We review case studies and find that
enforcement of off-label promotion prohibitions produced recordbreaking settlements. We also found that whistleblowers, rather
than regulators, often initiated these actions. However, these efforts have failed to sufficiently identify, address, and proactively
deter negative forms of off-label promotion that continue to
endanger public health and patient safety.
In Part IV, we summarize the limitations of the current regulatory framework and propose significant policy reform. We
recommend federal legislation to enable the FDA to approve offlabel use of drugs for specific, vulnerable patient populations, if
certain requirements of enrollment, risk-management, and
See Randall Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the FDA,
6.
358 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
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pharmacovigilance are met.' An FDA advisory committee with expertise in vulnerable patient populations would provide review and
recommendations for the FDA Commissioner. Further, we propose
the creation of a general off-label system to pre-approve proposed
off-label marketing, again using an advisory-committee structure.
This simple process would also allow courts to determine whether
drug companies are engaging appropriately in off-label marketing.
The proposed statute also clarifies approved off-label promotion
for manufacturers and provides a reduced-cost means of serving
vulnerable patient populations. Furthermore, to discourage repeat
inappropriate off-label marketing, penalties under the new system
for unauthorized off-label marketing would be severe. In addition
to fraud and abuse penalties, the offending drug company would
be banned from participating in the off-label program, and repeat
violations would be subject to mandatory exclusion from serving
any public health program.
Part V reviews how the new policy could benefit patients, government agencies, and manufacturers themselves. Here, we conclude
that our proposals offer significant benefits for all stakeholders, including increased access and information; clearer regulatory rules
and powers; specified definitions for appropriate off-label use; and
reduced costs of investigating other, smaller markets for manufacturers.
Finally, the Conclusion offers some closing remarks. We advocate
for a comprehensive solution that promotes beneficial uses of drugs
off-label and penalizes adverse off-label promotion. Such a solution
would protect patient safety and ensure the availability of scientifically sound clinical interventions for those most vulnerable.

I.

REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION

A. FDA Off-label Regulation

It is important to examine the current regulatory landscape that
has evolved around off-label promotion and use it to understand
the complex underpinnings of the debate on these issues. Though
off-label promotion was originally prohibited, current regulation of

7.
Pharmacovigilance is the practice of premarketing-and-postmarketing risk assessment, risk management, and risk minimization. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES
AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 2 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126834.pdf.
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off-label promotion is more unclear, leading to industry and regulator confusion and limited enforcement due to legal ambiguity."
Prior to 1997, the FDA primarily relied on two interpretations of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to prohibit off-label
marketing by manufacturers. The first of these allowed the FDA to
prohibit a manufacturer from introducing a drug into interstate
commerce with the intent of off-label use.9 The second interpretation categorized a product promoted for off-label use as illegally
"misbranded.""'o This interpretation allowed the FDA to strictly
prohibit direct advertising or explicit promotion of off-label uses
by manufacturers and enabled the agency to pursue substantial
enforcement actions such as injunctions, seizures, and criminal
penalties.
Importantly, this prohibition of off-label marketing did not apply to the practice of medicine. Hence, physicians could
prescribe any FDA-approved pharmaceutical off-label for whatever indication they deemed appropriate. The lack of regulation
of medical practice is historically well-grounded. Physicians occupy a class of professionals that has enjoyed autonomy and
discretion in patient treatment and drug prescribing." This "indirect" promotion created a regulatory gap, caused confusion,
and created an environment in which physicians could legally act
as marketing proxies for the pharmaceutical industry through
creative promotional strategies. For example, scientific literature
or Continuing Medical Education (CME) courses promoting offlabel uses could encourage practicing physicians to engage in
off-label use themselves.14
The FDA attempted to regulate these forms of indirect promotion by issuing guidance documents outlining what constituted
permissible dissemination of scientific literature and manufacturer

See Steven Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
8.
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181, 183, 189 (1999).
9.
See Michelle Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceuticals,360 NEW ENGL.J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009).
10.
See id.
11.
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("While a
manufacturer's direct advertising or explicit promotion of a product's off-label uses is likely
to provoke an FDA misbranding or 'intended use' enforcement action, manufacturers have
sought to employ more indirect methods of informing physicians about their products' offlabel uses."). For a discussion of injunctions for FDCA violations of misbranding, see George
Craft, Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a FraudulentBusiness Model, 8
Hous.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 103, 108 (2007). See also Mello et al., supranote 9, at 1558.
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLFl), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
12.
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 190.
13.
14.
See WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57-59.
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sponsorship of CME programs in 1996 and 1997, respectively.1 5
Collectively these guidance documents placed significant restraints
on manufacturers' ability to legally promote off-label uses to physicians, but they were short-lived. These efforts by the FDA were
halted by litigation contending that regulation of off-label promotion was unconstitutional. This protracted legal action has brought
with it confusion for both regulators and drug manufacturers in
determining what is legally permissible in off-label promotion activities.
B. Washington Legal FoundationLitigation

Following the issuance of the FDA guidance policies, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) challenged the provisions in
court. WLF is a non-profit, conservative legal organization that
primarily promotes "pro-business" policies. It acts as a public interest law firm and think tank to shape public policy away from what it
determines is intrusive regulation by state or federal government
agencies. 16
WLF brought two lawsuits against the FDA challenging its authority to regulate off-label promotion by pharmaceutical
companies because such restrictions violated principles of commercial free speech. This litigation, which questioned the FDA's
authority and its ability to fulfill its mandate to promote public
health and safety, shaped the subsequent regulatory landscape for
off-label promotion. Unfortunately, these legal challenges failed to
provide the regulatory clarity needed to encourage beneficial
forms of off-label promotion, which can better educate patients
and improve their access to potentially life-saving treatment options.
In the first decision, (WLF I), a district court struck down the
policies set forth in the 1996 and 1997 guidance documents and
enjoined their enforcement, finding that they violated the protections of free speech afforded by the First Amendment." The court
ruled both that manufacturers' dissemination of and support of
CME programs promoting off-label uses constituted commercial
15.
For 1996 FDA guidance, see Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800, 52,801 (Oct. 1, 1996). For 1997 FDA guidance, see
Guidance for Industry: Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 64,093, 64,094, 64,096-99 (Dec. 3, 1997).
SeeJacob Rogers, Essay, Freedom of Speech and the FDA's Regulation of Off-Label Drug Us16.
es, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1429, 1435 (2008) (describing the Washington Legal Foundation's
philosophy).
WLFI, 13 E Supp. 2d at 74.
17.
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speech and that the FDA guidance documents impermissibly restricted that speech.'
Shortly after WLF I, Congress passed the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). For the first time, a federal
statute specifically permitted certain regulated forms of off-label
marketing and promotion. 9 FDAMA effectively overrode and replaced the FDA guidance documents struck down by WLF 1.20
Though FDAMA opened the door to certain forms of information dissemination to promote off-label uses to physicians, it
also imposed restrictive requirements: manufacturers could only
disseminate "authorized information;" proposed off-label use required FDA approval and the filing of a supplemental new drug
application (sNDA); and off-label promotion required concurrent
disclosure of certain information." Furthermore, FDAMA also included provisions that enabled corrective actions by the FDA.
Many considered these restrictions highly prohibitive because they
significantly limited the type of information that could be presented to physicians. For example, only peer-reviewed, academic
journal articles required disclosures that such information was not
"approved or cleared by the [FDA]," and required manufacturers
to conduct research and apply for drug approval for new indications through a sNDA application. 2 Hence, although FDAMA was
the first law to specifically authorize off-label promotion, it did so
with the assumption that such off-label promotion would be followed by the necessary formal drug approval, and that physicians
18.
Id. After determining that FDA guidance document regulated commercial free
speech, the court in WLF I applied the four-part test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Seru. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). This test is used to determine if policy
restrictions on commercial free speech exceed constitutional limits. Id. Policy restrictions
meeting all four criteria of the test are held to not violate the First Amendment. Id. In applying the Central Hudson test, the WLFIcourt found that the guidance document satisfied only
three of the required four criteria. WLF 1, 13 F Supp. 2d at 65-74. The guidance satisfied
parts one, two, and three of the test as it involved legal activity and was not misleading, it
involved substantial governmental interest in incentivizing manufacturers to seek FDA approval for off-label uses, and it directly advanced this interest; but it failed the fourth part of
the test requiring that such restrictions be narrowly tailored to achieve this objective. See id.
19.
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 211.
20.
See Wash. LegalFound., 202 F. 3d at 334.
21.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aaa(b), 360aaa-1(a) (2006); Salbu, supra note 8, at 212-16. The
FDAMA permitted manufacturers to engage in off-label promotion to certain healthcare
groups and professionals provided they have filed an appropriate application for the promoted product. See Salbu, supra note 8, at 211-12. "Authorized information" that could be
disseminated only included unabridged peer-reviewed articles or qualified reference publications that were indexed in the National Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of
Health, significantly limiting the type of information for off-label promotion. See id. at 21314.
22.
See id. at 216.
23.
See id. at 213-16 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b) (1997)).
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and patients in the interim would be informed that off-label uses
had not been adequately tested or reviewed by FDA.
After passage of FDAMA, the FDA and Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) sought to limit the scope of the injunction imposed by the WLF I court on the 1996 and 1997
guidance documents. However, this attempt by the FDA and
DHHS to reassert its right to regulate off-label promotion was unsuccessful. In a later action brought by WLF in 1999 (WLF II), the
court also struck down FDAMA's sNDA application requirement.
Upon appeal of WLF II by the FDA and DHHS, the appellate court
dismissed and vacated the decision on the ground that both the
1996 and 1997 guidance documents, as well as the provisions contained in FDAMA concerning off-label promotion, were forms of
safe harbors.26 As safe harbors, they did not in fact prohibit speech
or certain conduct, but merely ensured manufacturers that enforcement action would not be taken if they conformed to certain
requirements. 27
WLF II had far-reaching impact. Which forms of off-label promotion would result in enforcement action and which would not
became increasingly unclear, and it conceptually shifted the FDA's
permitted role from active regulation to a more passive and minimalistic role. Another factor muddying the regulatory waters was
that FDAMA expired on September 30, 2006, and was not renewed; this formally ended its off-label promotion requirements.2 8
Overall, these constitutional challenges to the regulation of offlabel promotion and similar forms of commercial speech have
made it difficult for regulators and industry alike to determine
which off-label promotion is permitted and which is prohibited. As
long as this confusion persists, regulators lack the tools to effectively enforce rules against illegal promotion and manufacturers lack
the guidance to determine if their actions will be subject to
enforcement.

24.
See Craft, supra note 11, at 111.
25.
See id. (citing Wash. Legal Found., F. Supp. 2d at 87).
See Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 335-36; Mello et al., supra note 9, at 1559.
26.
See Craft, supra note 11, at 111-12.
27.
28.
Guidancefor Industry: Good Reprint Practicesfor the Distribution of MedicalJournalArticles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publicationson UnapprovedNew Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucml25126.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2009).
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C. Safety and Access Concerns

1. FDA Drug Approval Regulation
Any patient benefit that might be derived from off-label use is
tempered by the FDA's full or sNDA drug approval process. The
process hinders more proactive and innovative forms of clinical
practice even after evidence-based data emerges supporting a new
treatment pathway because of the long, costly process of testing for
safety and efficacy of new drugs prior to market approval. 9 There
are also no systems that permit abbreviated marketing approval to
reach vulnerable patient populations and their physicians.
Drug approval delay is exceedingly pertinent to vulnerable and
rare-disease populations. A slow FDA approval process can be injurious to patients who lack information about and access to effective
treatments and it is especially harmful to those who have no approved treatment options available. To add insult to injury, FDA
review and approval of new drugs and devices are not guarantees
of safety or efficacy, as reflected by a number of high-profile recalls
of drugs such as that of Merck's blockbuster anti-inflammatory and
pain management drug, Vioxx.30
Further, the current regulatory scheme allows manufacturers to
game the system by seeking indications that are easier or more likely to be approved.31 This strategy speeds up the market approval
process and allows manufacturers to develop marketing campaigns
to promote off-label uses at the same time. 2 This enables manufacturers to avoid the more rigorous testing and scrutiny for safety
and efficacy applied to an approved indication, even though an offlabel use may be marketed more extensively than the approved
indication itself.3 Such use of off-label promotion to explicitly

29.
See id.
30.
See COX-2 Selective (includes Bextra, Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal
Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucml03420.htm
(last
updated Mar. 3, 2010).
31.
This practice is known as applying for "decoy" indications, while in parallel developing extensive off-label marketing campaigns for other more common indications. See
Adriane Fugh-Berman & Douglas Melnick, Off-Label Promotion, On-Target Sales, 5 PLoS MED.
1432, 1433 (2008). Manufacturers may also target rare diseases such as orphan indications
and use them as decoy indications to expedite the review process. See id.
32.
See id.
33.
See Mark Ratner & Trisha Gura, Off-Label or Off-Limits?, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 867, 870-71, 873 (2008) (quoting Jerry Avorn of Harvard Medical School and Brigham
and Women's Hospital regarding lack of incentives for evidence-based research when offlabel promotion is an option).
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avoid comprehensive safety and efficacy testing can have dire consequences for patient safety.
2. Recent FDA Off-Label Guidance
Off-label regulation is an important safety concern. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have an inherent conflict of interest when
marketing their products because they are attempting to maximize
profit.14 This conflict encourages the illegal promotion of off-label
uses in the medical literature that may misrepresent safety and efficacy data.15 Such efforts aim to create larger pools of patient
3
populations, especially for drugs that have narrow indications. "
Yet recent guidance documents finalized in January 2009
reemphasized the limited role the FDA plays in regulating off-label
promotion by manufacturers. These guidelines significantly diminish the FDA's oversight of off-label promotion by no longer
requiring sNDA applications for new indications and by removing
the requirement that the FDA review journal articles used for such
promotion prior to dissemination. While the FDA still requires
peer review for journal articles, practices such as selective publication; manipulation of data; omission of critical data necessary for
evaluation of off-label use; and undermining of the NDA review
process, as well as the overall risk posed by conflict of interest situations that may bias data in studies; have called into question the
propriety of the FDA's hands-off approach.
In addition, the guidance lacks meaningful penalties for manufacturer violations. This lack of oversight caused Rep. Henry
Waxman (D-CA) to describe the new guidelines as a "long-coveted
parting gift" to the pharmaceutical industry by the former Bush
administration; Waxman and others have indicated that future legislative action may be necessary. " Most observers in the
Cf Bryan Liang & Tim Mackey, Confronting Conflict: Addressing Institutional Conflicts
34.
of Interest in Academic Medical Centers, 36 Am. J.L. & MED. 136, 137, 143-44 (2010) (discussing
the institutional conflicts of interest inherent among academic medical centers doing business with profit-driven pharmaceutical companies).
See id. at 142, 147 n.42, 154 n.82.
35.
See, e.g., Fugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432 (discussing pharmaceuti36.
cal corporations seeking a narrow indication for a rare disease like rabies, and promoting
for a wider indication such as cancer).
37.
See id. at 1433.
38.
See Psaty & Ray, supra note 1, at 1949-50.
See Chris Adams, Late Move on Drugs by Bush FDA Could Be Dangerous, McCLATCHY
39.
(Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/02/01/61113/late-move-on-drugs-bybush-fda.html. Note that Rep. Waxman was considering introducing additional legislation to
address recent FDA guidance to better assess whether dissemination of journal articles by

FALL

2011]

Off-Label Promotion Reform

11

pharmaceutical industry have viewed the release of these recent
guidelines favorably because they provide more certainty that these
off-label promotions will not be actively prosecuted.40

D. Policy Inadequacy

Given the ambiguity of recent guidance and the realities of limited scrutiny of off-label practices, many public interest groups feel
the current policy is inadequate.' In addition, provider groups
such as the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy and the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists have commented that
the new policy does not provide adequate guidance regarding
distribution of biased reprints that may mislead physicians about
off-label uses.
These recent FDA trends, deregulation of off-label promotion
and reliance on industry self-policing, are fraught with conflicts of
interest that could endanger public health. As recently as 2008, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report detailing its findings that the FDA lacked adequate systems and
procedures for review and oversight of off-label promotional

pharmaceutical corporations is appropriate. See Mike Mitka, Critics Say FDA's OffLabel Guidance Allows MarketingDisguised as Science, 299J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1759, 1760 (2008).
See Anna Wilde Mathews & Avery Johnson, Boost for Off-Label Drug Use: DA Would
40.
Let Firms Keep Doctors Informed on Unapproved Methods, WALL ST.J., Feb 16, 2008, at A3.
41.
See Stephen Barlas, New FDA Guidance on Off-Label PromotionFalls Short for Everyone,
34 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 122, 122 (2009). In 2008, the Patient and Consumer Coalition, an organization comprised of public interest groups such as the Center for Science in
the Public Interest, Consumer Union, the Prescription Project, National Physician's Alliance, and others, issued comments strongly criticizing the proposed FDA guidance. See
Comments of the Patient & Consumer Coal. to the U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Good Reprint
Practices for the Distribution of Med. Journal Articles & Med. or Scientific Reference
Publ'ns on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs & Approved or Cleared Med. Devices,
Draft Guidance, Docket No. FDA-2008-D-0053 (Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://
www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/20080421_groupcomments onfda-offlabel-draft-guidelines.doc [hereinafter Comments]. These comments argued that the guidance was too lenient, lacked enforcement tools, undermined the FDA's authority to prohibit
illegal off-label promotion, and lowered incentives for manufacturers to seek FDA approval
of drugs. Id.
See Barlas, supra note 41, at 122-23 (noting how provider groups view existing
42.
guidance as lacking, and advocate for off-label use education in CME). Drug manufacturers
and physician associations have also challenged the constitutionality of limited off-label
promotion regulation by the FDA, arguing they violate the First Amendment. See Mary Anne
Pazanowski, Surgeons' Group Supports Motion to Enjoin FDA's Restrictions on Off-Label Promotions,
4 MED. DEVICES L. & INDUSTRY REP. (BNA) 294, 294 (2010). In addition, hopes that the
Obama administration would address off-label marketing failed to be realized in the recent
healthcare reform bill. See Barlas, supra note 41, at 122; Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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materials and activities.43 The FDA's most recent guidance, which
raises doubt about future proactive regulation in this arena, has
only exacerbated this lack of oversight.
More recently, regulators and prosecutors have considered increasing enforcement efforts by targeting industry executives
directly. Such actions would hold them criminally responsible for
the risk to public health that results from illegal marketing.4 These
prosecutions could occur even if company officials were unaware
of the illegal activity.4 5 In response, WLF issued a statement criticizing this brand of enforcement as unproductive.
Past practices of off-label promotion, litigation brought by WLF,
the sunset of the FDAMA provisions, and inconsistent FDA guidance have resulted in a policy landscape that is confusing and
ineffectual. Litigation has dictated the course of off-label regulation, yet it has neither provided a clear path for manufacturers to
engage in responsible off-label promotion nor given regulators or
courts the tools to effectively detect and police illegal off-label
promotion. Importantly, this ambiguity provides no benefit to patients that are denied access to important treatments or prescribed
inappropriate drugs.

II.

PROS AND CONS OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION

Both the potential benefits and potential disadvantages of offlabel promotion in clinical practice have been hotly debated. However, regulators and policy makers have not addressed how to
appropriately utilize off-label promotion given these pros and cons,
even though the consequences are very real for patients and the
public health.

43.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-08-835,

FDA's
5-6 (2008), available at

PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:

OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08835.pdf.
44.
See MandyJackson, Drug,Device Executives Targeted, L.A. DAILYJ., Oct 25, 2010, at 1.
45.
See id.
46.
See Brian Broderick, Legal Group Pushes Back at FDA on Plans to Prosecute More Executives, 4 MED. DEVICES L. & INDUSTRY REP. (BNA) 755, 755 (2010), available at www.wlf.org/
Upload/misc/pressclips/10281OBNA.pdf.
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A. PotentialBenefits

1. Clinical Use and Application
With more than one in five of all drug prescriptions for an offlabel use,47 it is clear that the promotion of off-label use is widespread and in some cases may represent a valid and necessary form
of clinical practice. Off-label use is not only highly prevalent, but
also a necessary component of medical practice that increases access for underserved populations to treatment options, increases
the diffusion of scientific knowledge, hastens the development of
innovative clinical treatment methods, and represents a viable
form of cost-containment when compared to the costly regulatory
process of FDA drug approval.
Indeed, off-label prescribing allows for creativity and innovation
in the practice of medicine by physicians who may alter treatment
standards based on emerging evidence supporting new therapies.
Such action can be construed as proactive, with physicians on the
"front lines" of clinical practice, dealing with patients directly and
interacting on a personal level. The direct monitoring of and interaction with patients allow physicians to react to changing
conditions and patient feedback in order to deliver better care
through off-label uses.5o The potential benefits of off-label use are
reflected in evidence-based literature, including clinical-trial data.
Some clinical practice guidelines also adopt off-label prescribing as
part of their recommendations." Such inclusion of off-label uses
can have a profound impact on adoption, reimbursement, profes51
sional liability, and quality measurements in clinical care.
For example, off-label use of drugs in the treatment of cancer
has become widespread, with an estimated 50-75% prevalence."
This increased use is due to a number of factors, including: (a) the
47.
See Radley, supra note 3, at 1021.
48.
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 193-198.
49.
See Stafford, supra note 6, at 1427.
50.
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 196-97.
51.
See Harold C. Sox, Evaluating Off-Label Uses of Anticancer Drugs: Time for a Change,
150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 353, 353-54 (2009). Clinical practice guidelines are professional consensus regarding the most appropriate drugs for specific clinical situations. See id. at
353. These can vary greatly based on the available evidence and the organization issuing the
guidelines. See id.
52.
See id. Note that inclusion of off-label uses in clinical practice guidelines and medical compendium, which lists drugs and their recommended uses, is the subject of debate
given that it is built on available evidence and may vary based on the issuing organization.
See id.
Tracy Hampton, Experts Weigh in on Promotion, Prescriptionof Off-Label Drugs, 297 J.
53.
Am. MED. Ass'N 683, 683 (2007).
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large number of cancer types; (b) evidence-based support for offlabel use in multiple cancer indications; (c) the impracticality of
seeking approved drug indication status for all cancer types; and
(d) lack of financial incentives to seek additional indications for
manufacturers, especially after patent exclusivity has expired. 4
These benefits have established off-label use of cancer drugs as a
mainstay in oncology practice, and it is now viewed as a highly effective, accepted, and innovative route of treatment.5 5
Accordingly, off-label use has been credited as beneficial in many
other areas of clinical practice, and commentators have observed
that off-label use may maximize the utility of a drug and enable access to the greatest number of potential patients."6 Other beneficial
examples include the off-label use of anti-retroviral combination
therapy in the treatment of AIDS as well as the widespread use of
prescription aspirin to reduce the risk of heart attack.
2. Vulnerable Patient Populations: Information and Access
In addition to permitting advances in medical care treatment,
off-label promotion is especially important for those who suffer
from life-threatening diseases and do not have access to FDAapproved therapy. Large clinical trials used to assess the safety and
efficacies of such drugs are extremely difficult in these relatively
small populations, because they often lack sufficient study subjects.
This inability to conduct trials necessitates some alternative method of access. 58 Appropriate off-label promotion to vulnerable
patient populations and their physicians may provide such a method while disseminating information about promising treatments.
This is particularly needed because physicians have been shown to
possess limited knowledge of treatment alternatives for orphan
disease and other underserved patients. 9
See P.G. Casali, The Off-Label Use of Drugs in Oncology: A Position Paperby the European
54.
Society for Medical Oncology (ESMO), 18 ANNALS ONCOL. 1923, 1923 (2007).
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 193-94.
55.
56.
See id. at 194.
See id. at 194-95. Note that aspirin does not fall under the traditional definition of
57.
off-label use or promotion as it is an over-the-counter, rather than prescription, drug. However, though its primary packaging indicates that it should be used for pain relief and fever
reduction, aspirin is also heavily promoted as reducing the risk of heart attacks and ischemic
strokes. See id. The FDA only approved these additional indications in the 1980s and late
1990s. See Charles H. Hennekens et al., Aspirin as a TherapeuticAgent in CardiovascularDisease,
96 CIRCULATION 2751 (1997).
58.
See Casali, supra note 54, at 1923-24.
59.
See Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Reforming Off-Label Promotion to Enhance Orphan
Disease Treatment, 327 SCIENCE 273, 273-74 (2010).
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a. Orphan DiseasePatients

Appropriate forms of off-label use, prescribing, and promotion
can improve access to beneficial clinical treatment for underserved
populations. This includes patients diagnosed with "orphan" conditions that lack an approved treatment pathway. 60 In fact,
approximately 90 percent of the thirty million patients suffering
from such rare diseases are prescribed at least one drug for offlabel use." This statistic underscores the need for patient access to
off-label clinical treatments.
Patient groups such as the National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD), which advocates on behalf of underserved patient
populations affected by rare diseases, have acknowledged the potential benefit of off-label use with appropriate medical
justification in administration of their Medication Assistance Programs.62 NORD has also emphasized the importance of establishing
appropriate mechanisms for reimbursement of off-label uses by
payers in future healthcare legislation.6 ' This is a response to the
growing insurance practice of denying coverage by classifying offlabel drug use as experimental, further limiting access and clinical
options for patients who may have few other alternatives.
Recently, the FDA launched an orphan disease drug development database to encourage manufacturers to develop drugs for
rare diseases by identifying products that have already received
FDA approval and that have potential to treat rare diseases
through added indications.6 5 This development emphasizes the
need for further research to promote orphan drug discovery and
treatments, but fails to address the need to provide appropriate
incentive mechanisms for manufacturers to incur the cost of
See id. An orphan condition is one that afflicts less than 200,000 patients in the US.
60.
See generally Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
61.

See Treating Rare and Neglected Pediatric Diseases: Promoting the Development of New

Treatments and Cures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
111th Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Diane Dorman, Vice President for
Public Policy, National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD)), available at http://
www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dormanl.pdf.
62.
Medication Assistance Programs administered by NORD provide life-saving drugs
to uninsured and underinsured patients who cannot otherwise gain access to treatment and
are done in partnerships with pharmaceutical companies which determine eligibility criteria. See Marlene Krammer, The National Organizationfor Rare Disorders and the Experience of the
Rare Disorder Community, THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF RARE DISORDERS 11, 1-34 (2003).
See Hearing,supra note 61, at 4-5.
63.
64.
See id. at 4.
65.
Amy Dockser Marcus, FDA Database Aims to Spark Orphan-DiseaseDrug Development,
WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (June 18, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/
06/18/fda-database-aims-to-spark-orphan-disease-drug-development/.
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expanded approved labeling, which has been described as unprofitable and unattractive from a business perspective.
The potential benefits of off-label promotion and subsequent
use by vulnerable patient populations are significant and should be
taken into account by regulators and lawmakers. As current policy
stands, drug manufacturers have little incentive to seek costly FDA
approval for an indication that has little chance of return on investment. For potentially fatal and debilitating diseases, off-label
use may be one of the only ways to provide effective treatment to
these patients in the absence of other clinical pathways.

b. PediatricandPregnantPatients

Two additional sets of patients that depend on off-label use and
promotion are the pediatric population and pregnant women. Offlabel use is already widely accepted in pediatric care. An estimated
75 percent of marketed prescription drugs have no labeling indications for pediatric populations, making all use of these drugs in
children off-label.6 s Like orphan disease patients, pediatric populations are a relatively small percentage of the total patient
population, and clinical research involving children can be prohibitively expensive and ethically challenging.69 Because pharmaceutical
manufacturers have little incentive to engage in development of
drugs or drug guidelines for these populations,'o off-label may be the
defacto norm in pediatric prescribing."

66.
Ben Moscovitch, FDA Hopes to Bring Rare Disease Uses On-Label With New Database,
HEALTHPOLICYNEWSSTAND, (June 24, 2010, 8:47 PM), http://healthpolicynewsstand.com/
FDA-Week/FDA-Week-06/25/2010/fda-hopes-to-bing-rare-disease-uses-on-label-with-newdatabase/menu-id-315.html (describing pharmaceutical industry view that expanding drug
label indications is not profitable for firms).
67.
Examples include the use of drugs such as Zenapax for the treatment of multiple
sclerosis, John Rose, Monoclonal Antibody Treatment in MS, U.S. DEPARTMENT VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.va.gov/MS/articles/MonoclonalAntibody TreatmentforMS.asp (last updated Dec. 2009), and the majority of cancer treatments, which are provided off label. Cf Offlabel Drug Use: What is Off-Label Drug Use?, Am. CANCER Soc'Y, http://www.cancer.org/
Treatment/TreatmentsandSideEffects/TreatmentTypes/Chemotherapy/off-label-drug-use
(last revised Mar. 14, 2011).
68.
See Fugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432.
69.
Cf Geert Jong et al., Correspondence, Unapproved and Off-Label Use of Drugs in a
Children'sHospital,343 NEW ENGL.J. MED. 1125, 1125 (2000).
70.
See Jeffrey L. Blumer, OffLabel Uses of Drugs in Children, 104 PEDIATRICS 598, 598602 (1999) (noting the pharmaceutical industry's low incentive to develop drugs for
children and infants).
Studies have shown that close to 80 percent of hospitalized children may be receiv71.
ing drugs off-label. See, e.g., Samir Shah et al., Off-Label Drug Use in Hospitalized Children, 161
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 282, 282-83 (2007) (finding in a study of hospital-
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Lack of approved indications for these populations has led to a
paucity of drugs that are properly formulated or approved for use
by children. The resulting widespread off-label prescribing includes treatment regimens modified by hospital pharmacies for
dosage, frequency, dosage form, or route of administration. Medical literature also reflects this lack of attention; important
physician reference material, such as the Physicians' Desk Reference, do not include or address dosage, safety, or efficacy
information for administration of drugs in children or infants.73
With few formally approved options to treat pediatric populations,
off-label use in this population has been seen as both necessary
71
and appropriate.
Pregnant women also rarely participate in clinical trials; therefore, they also need access to off-label information. Widespread
exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials presents significant
challenges in administering approved treatments. This is especially
true given that the various and complex physiological changes that
occur during pregnancy make determining appropriate dosages difficult, hence necessitating off-label use by clinicians.7 ' Examples
include the off-label use of methotrexate, which is widely regarded as an effective treatment of ectopic pregnancy. Since ectopic
pregnancy occurs only in approximately 0.64 percent of pregnancies in the U.S., and since pregnant women have been historically
underrepresented in clinical studies, treatment for this condition
must be off-label. This is an example of both the widely accepted

ized patients eighteen years or younger that at least one drug was prescribed off label in 78.7
percent of cases).
72.
SeeJong et al., supra note 69, at 1125.
73.
The Physicians' Desk Reference is a compilation of prescribing information for
prescription drugs provided to physicians in order to aid them in writing prescriptions. See
2011 Physicians' Desk Reference, PDR BoOKSTORE.COM, https://www.pdrbookstore.com/
ProdDetails.asp?ID=9781563637803&PG=1&Type=BL&PCS=PDR (last visited Sept. 3, 2011);
Blumer, supra note 70, at 598.
74.
See Blumer, supra note 70, at 602.
75.
See Francoise Baylis, Pregnant Women Deserve Better, 465 NATURE 689, 689-90 (2010).
76.
Methotrexate is approved by the FDA for treatment of choriocarcinoma. Trexall,
RxLisT, http://www.rxlist.com/trexall-drug.htm (last reviewed Nov. 20, 2007). Studies have
shown that off-label use of methotrexate for ectopic pregnancies has had an overall success
rate over 90 percent. See, e.g., Gary Lipscomb et al., Analysis of Three Hundred Fifteen Ectopic
Pregnancies Treated With Single-Dose Methotrexate, 178 AM.J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY. 1354,
1354-55 (1998).
77.
See Karen Hoover et al., Trends in the Diagnosisand Treatment of Ectopic Pregnancy in
the United States, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 495, 499 (2010) (discussing low rate of
ectopic pregnancy in the United States). For a discussion on how pregnant women are routinely excluded for clinical trials and their need for off-label use of medication, see FughBerman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432.
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beneficial use of a drug off-label, as well its administration to a
population in need.

B. Negative Effects

1. Safety and Regulatory Concerns
While the potential benefits of off-label use-such as preserving
the autonomy of physicians to innovate in their clinical practice,
better treatment options for underserved patients, and the possibility of faster delivery of clinically viable uses of drugs-are
legitimate, potential negative consequences also require close examination. There are significant concerns regarding safety and
efficacy of unapproved and under-evaluated uses. They include
discouragement of more viable evidenced-based practices and clinical testing, wasted financial resources, conflicts of interest, and
opportunities for pharmaceutical manufacturers to bypass regulatory approval and the expense of more thorough clinical study.
Perhaps the most important criticism of off-label promotion and
use of drugs without full FDA approval is that such a policy creates
disincentives for robust testing.80 This can be especially problematic
for off-label use of prescription drugs with a high-risk profile and
whose widespread unsafe use can lead to public health emergencies.' Studies have also questioned the safety and effectiveness of
off-label uses of medications in pediatrics, arguing that minimizing
safety risks requires more effective testing and monitorpotential
82

ing.

As well, beyond limited scientific testing, these drugs do not
have appropriate labeling for the off-label indication, may not have
proper dosage information, and do not report important risk information, all of which can represent a risk to public health and
patient safety. 3 Indeed, lack of a standardized label may contribute
to confusion as to which uses are approved and which are not.

78.
See Stafford, supra note 6, at 1427-28.
79.
See id.
See Salbu, supranote 8, at 201, 205-06.
80.
81.
See id. at 202-03 (regarding general lack of regulatory control for off-label applications, such as the wide-spread use of fenfluramine (fen-phen), resulting in unnecessary
harm to patients).
SeeJulie M. Zito et al., Off-Label Psychopharmacologic Prescribingfor Children: History
82.
Supports Close ClinicalMonitoring,2 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH 24
(Sep. 15, 2008), http://www.capmh.com/content/2/1/24.
See Salbu, supra note 8, at 202.
83.
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Off-label promotion also is problematic from a regulatory incentive perspective. Although pharmaceutical companies can obtain
FDA approval for new indications through a sNDA, this process
requires rigorous safety and efficacy testing for the new indication.
The costs of new clinical trials and potential for adverse data,
which could reduce or eliminate future off-label use or negatively
affect existing sales of products already prescribed off-label, discourages the use of this system. This regulatory system hinders
business; hence, the balance of incentives favors off-label promo-

tion.14
2. Bioethical Arguments
There are also bioethical arguments regarding off-label use and
whether it constitutes experimentation on human subjects that
requires a patient's informed consent. Since off-label use and promotion are not well-known or well-understood concepts, patients
may suffer from lack of adequate disclosure of information regarding the benefits and risks of off-label uses. This informational
asymmetry gives rise to concerns about informed consent and
complicates the challenge of addressing this issue.
It is clear that most patients have little if any knowledge of the
subtleties of off-label versus FDA-approved indications for drugs.
For example, recent surveys suggest that patients believe drugs are
always prescribed as approved by the FDA." In fact, patients may
have limited knowledge about the widespread practice of off-label
prescribing, since there is no FDA requirement of informed consent for these activities. This contrasts with clinical trials and other
clinical interventions, which both require full disclosure."
The result is that physicians administer drugs to patients off-label
without disclosing that the treatment deviates from FDA-approved
indications and that, in fact, there may be limited evidence-based
data supporting the off-label use. This practice is encouraged by
illegal off-label promotion activities by pharmaceutical companies
and, in combination with undisclosed potential financial conflicts of
See Ratner & Gura, supra note 33, at 870.
84.
See Margaret Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescrip85.
tions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 967, 968 (2007).
See id. at 974.
86.
See Michael Wilkes & Margaret Johns, Informed Consent and Shared Decision-Making: A
87.
Requirement to Disclose to Patients Off-Label Prescriptions,5 PLoS MED. 1553, 1553-55 (2008).
Informed consent involves the disclosure to a patient of the nature of the intervention, the
potential negative and positive risks and benefits of intervention, alternatives to the intervention, and the risks and benefits of potential alternatives. See id. at 1554.
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interest and/or inaccurate medical literature, may result in increased inappropriate prescribing with patients shouldering the
risk.88 Hence, physicians have an ethical obligation to disclose and
patients have the fundamental right to know when a drug is being
prescribed off-label, and both should be encouraged to make a
shared decision on whether to accept such a treatment option."
Consequently, bioethical arguments surrounding off-label use
and prescribing as well as the shift to greater patient autonomy in
the clinical setting have led to calls to mandate the disclosure of
off-label use by physicians under the legal doctrine of informed
consent.90 Proponents of this position argue that off-label use and
prescribing is inherently experimental, and the potential risks,
benefits, and alternatives need to be disclosed so that patients can
make informed decisions about their own care. 9' However, others
have warned that such a disclosure mandate could stifle clinical
innovation and would be unduly burdensome for physicians to implement given the difficulty in determining the risks and benefits
of off-label use.92
3. Tainted Literature
The publication of clinical studies is crucial to both the approval
and marketing of pharmaceuticals, including off-label use and
promotion. Scientific articles and journals are used to validate the
efficacy and safety of drugs, advertise a drug's benefits, and inform
physicians in their clinical practices.
One of the primary concerns regarding off-label promotion is the
validity and accuracy of off-label clinical publications that are distributed by industry representatives. 3 However, this distribution of
published articles to promote off-label uses may mislead physicians.
These concerns surround three basic areas: selective publishing, systematic manipulation of literature, and the absence of analysis
regarding the safety and efficacy of off-label uses.

88.
See id.
89.
Note that in medical practice informed consent is required prior to starting a
treatment or performing a test. See id. at 1553.
90.
See id. at 1554.
91.
See id. at 1555.
92.
See id.
93.
See Liang & Mackey, supra note 34, at 153, 154 n.82.
94.
See Psaty & Ray, supra note 1, at 1950.
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a. Selective Publishing

Selective publishing raises issues regarding whether manufacturers are adequately representing the current state of knowledge
and fully disclosing all study data regarding risks and benefits of
their products.5 Research has shown that manufacturers do not
publish unfavorable clinical results regarding their products due to
potential negative economic consequences and an absence of any
affirmative obligation." Selective publication is symptomatic of the
conflict of interest that exists in sponsor-initiated clinical trials.
Sponsors have little or no incentive to publish or distribute findings that may negatively affect sales. This gives rise to a systemic
bias in published work and subsequent pharmaceutical sales pitches-known as "detailing"-based on these "studies."97
This situation also raises serious questions about the validity and
reliability of information physicians receive and use in their clinical
practice, further undermining the integrity of appropriate off-label
drug use. Without any third-party oversight of distribution and review of medical literature that may promote off-label uses, it is
impossible to ensure that the information provided is a complete
and fair representation of the actual clinical data favoring or opposing off-label use.
b. LiteratureManipulation:Ghostwriting

Sponsors of clinical studies have also systematically manipulated
data by controlling the design, research, and analysis of such studies. 8 Even the authorship of a study can be altered for marketing
purposes through a practice known as ghostwriting.99 Scientific
ghostwriting is the practice of pharmaceutical companies either
authoring papers in house or hiring medical education and communication companies (MECC) to write clinical papers favorable
to their products, while not providing full disclosure regarding
authorship.oo
95.
See id.
96.
See id.
97.
See id.
98.
See id.
99.
See id.
100. These pharmaceutical companies may not only write the papers, but may also hire
experts and well-known academics to "author" the papers by co-writing or collaborating with
a ghostwriter to review, revise or, in some cases, simply sign their name to a manuscript. See
Barton Moffatt & Carl Elliot, Ghost Marketing: PharmaceuticalCompanies and Ghostwrittenjournal Articles, 50 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 18, 19 (2007). These hired experts lend credibility
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Ghostwriting exacerbates previous concerns regarding validity
and reliability of potentially biased clinical research that appears in
the medical literature. When articles list well-known experts as authors, physicians even further rely upon these "studies" in
developing their clinical practice, even though they may actually be
the product of marketing campaigns coordinated by pharmaceutical companies.
Unfortunately, ghostwritten papers often include the promotion
of off-label uses. For example, support for the off-label use of the
drug Gabapentin was generated by a marketing plan and payments
made to MECCs to develop materials, rather than by evidencebased research.' 1 Ghostwritten articles may unduly influence and
mislead physicians about the benefits and risks involved with certain forms of off-label promotion that can endanger public
health. 0 2 The prevalence of ghostwriting is alarming, and unlike
the process by which new drugs are approved by the FDA, selective
publishing and ghostwriting limit the ability of regulators and physicians to adequately identify and scrutinize clinical data.'03

c. Lack of Safety Assessments

Off-label drug use is often untested for clinical efficacy and safety in the targeted population, and, as suggested above, may not be
adequately supported by unbiased and reliable evidence-based
medical literature. 104 The combination of untrustworthy scientific
data and illegal off-label promotion by manufacturers can lead to
adverse effects. Drugs may be prescribed in inappropriate dosage
levels, used in patient populations whose physiological or psychological conditions may make such use unsafe, or even prescribed in
direct contravention of FDA warnings.' For example, the appetite

and neutrality to such papers. Stephanie Ngai et al., Haunted Manuscripts: Ghost Authorship in
the Medical Literature,12 ACCOUNTABILITY REs. 103, 104 (2005). However, this practice raises
questions regarding the credibility of findings, negative consequences of potential conflicts
of interests, and issues regarding accountability and responsibility over content. See Moffat
& Elliot, supra note 100, at 23-24.
101. See Psaty & Ray, supranote 1, at 1950.
102. See Moffatt & Elliot, supra note 100, at 23-24.
103. See Paul Basken, Medical 'Ghosturiting'IsStill a Common Practice, Study Shows, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUc. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Medical-Chostwriting-Is-a/
48347/. For a discussion of the difficulty of regulators and the public in identifying and
scrutinizing the presence of ghost authors in published studies, see Psaty & Ray, supra note
1, at 1951.
104. SeeFugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432-33.
105. SeeJohns, supra note 85, at 968-69.
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suppressant fenfuramine' 6 had eighteen million prescriptions written off-label for weight loss prior to the discovery of adverse events
due to long-term use, resulting in some 285,000 patients suffering
heart damage.' 7 Similarly, off-label use of Botox in the treatment
of limb spasticity associated with cerebral palsy in children has
been linked to serious medical problems including hospitalization
and death.'s Off-label use has also been associated with increased
frequency and severity of adverse events in children, where offlabel prescribing is dominant.'09
Indeed, even the presence of express warnings do not preclude
physician prescribing for off-label uses. For example, Eli Lilly's
marketing of Zyprexa was subject to legal penalties for illegal offlabel promotion that pushed the drug's use for dementia in the
elderly, which represented clear patient safety risks."o In fact, there
was a black box warning on Zyprexa's package insert that specifically indicated that studies had revealed a risk of increased
mortality in elderly patients with dementia associated with the
drug."' Yet physicians continued to prescribe the drug inappropriately based on off-label promotion." 2
III.

EMPIRICAL INFORMATION FROM ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Despite languishing regulatory oversight, federal and state
prosecutors have targeted inappropriate off-label promotion. Indeed, prosecutions involving fraudulent or misleading off-label
promotion have led to record-breaking settlements. The statutory
bases for these prosecutions include the False Claims Act and the
Anti-Kickback Statute, among others." 3 Importantly, this litigation
also serves to provide information on how some industry actors
106. See Fugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432 (describing fenfluramine
(Pondimin), an appetite suppressant approved for short-term use which was promoted offlabel as "fen-phen" for longer durations).
107. SeeJohns, supra note 85, at 977.
108. See Rita Rubin, Off-Label Botox Use Linked to Serious Side Effects, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb.
11, 2008, at 12D.
109. Fugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 31, at 1432.
110. See Alex Berenson, DrugFiles Show Maker Promoted Unapproved Use, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
18, 2006, at Al.
111. See Zyprexa DrugDescription, RxLIsT, http://www.rxlist.com/zyprexa-drug.htm (last
reviewedJan. 18, 2011).
112. See Berenson, supra note 110; see alsoJohn Carey, Do CholesterolDrugs Do Any Good?,
BUSINEssWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 52 (quoting Dr. Howard Brody and Dr. Bryan Liang on
inappropriate but effective off-label marketing of drugs like Lipitor by Pfizer).
113. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006); Anti-Kickback Statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
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inappropriately promote off-label drug use.'14 Yet even with these
prosecution, fraudulent and misleading off-label promotion continues to be a problem.

A. False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback Provisions

1. False Claims Act
Using the False Claims Act (FCA), corporate whistleblowers can
file suit on behalf of the government for false claims submitted to
federal or state funded programs resulting from illegal off-label
promotional activities."' In these cases, manufacturers are deemed
to have submitted false claims by promotion of off-label uses that
are not authorized for reimbursement by the government through
Medicare and Medicaid programs."6 The FCA has been widely used
to enforce pharmaceutical marketing regulations by the federal
government through reimbursement in government healthcare
programs. 117
114. See Stafford, supra note 6, at 1428 (noting how litigation arising out of off-label
promotion of gabapentin and olanzapine (Zyprexa) raises important questions about this
practice).
115. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. The False Claims Act ("FCA") is a federal law that allows for prosecutions of individuals and entities that fraudulently bill the U.S. government,
including federal and state healthcare payers such as Medicare and Medicaid. See id. The Act
specifically prohibits (a) submitting a false claim; (b) making or using a false record or
statement for a false claim; and (c) conspiring to commit a violation of the FCA; among
other provisions. See id. It also imposes triple damages on a party found guilty under the
FCA. See id. "Qui tam" provisions under the False Claims Act allow private individuals acting
as qui tam "relators" to bring a suit on the federal government's behalf involving past or
present fraudulent acts. See id. § 3730(b). Relators can bring suit against defendants who
have knowingly submitted or caused the submission of a false or fraudulent claim to the U.S.
government. See id. Such suits have been used extensively in healthcare fraud and abuse
claims. Relators are given an incentive to report fraud and abuse because they share in a
certain percentage of the recoverable damages, ranging from 15-30 percent in addition to
legal fees and other related costs. Id. § 3730(d). Hence, off-label promotion may be prosecuted as a false claim submitted to the government for improper off-label uses. For
discussion of FCA provisions as they apply to off-label use and promotion, see Craft, supra
note 11, at 112-14.
116. See Craft, supra note 11, at 112-13.
117. See Sally Wang, False Claims Act: The Right Treatment for Off-Label Marketing?, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHics 708, 708-09 (2010); Robert Blume et al., 2010 Year-End False Claims Act Update: Part 1, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Mar. 24, 2011), http://newsandinsight.
thomsonreuters.com/Legal/insight/2011/03_-_march/2010-year-endfalse claims-act_
update
part_1/. Note that the federal government does not regulate the practice of medicine, which is governed by state law of medical licensure and malpractice tort law. Physician
Licensure: An Update of Trends, Am. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/aboutama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-physicians-section/advocacy-resources/
physician-licensure-an-update-trends.page (last visited September 3, 2011). It should also be
noted that, in the case of Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.
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Originally enacted during the Civil War in 1863 to prevent fraud
perpetuated by private contractors, the FCA has been used to prosecute illegal off-label marketing primarily involving kickbacks."" In
2010, the Department of Justice negotiated a $422.5 million civil
and criminal settlement with Novartis AG for illegally promoting its
anti-epileptic drug, Trileptal, for off-label use to treat psychiatric
conditions while also providing kickbacks to healthcare professionals to encourage them to prescribe their drugs."' This settlement
represents a prime example of successful FCA prosecutions in this
area.
2. Anti-Kickback Statute Violations
At the same time, if a marketing campaign includes any payments or remuneration, directly or indirectly, to drive referrals of
federal healthcare dollars, there may also be a cognizable claim
under the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 2 0 These kickbacks can come in
2009), the 11th Circuit ruled that a plaintiff must demonstrate intent to market off-label.
The court held that the relators under a qui tam action must plead specific allegations of
false claims with particularity to survive dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 9(b). Id. at 1330-31. Even if a relator provides a complaint with factual allegations that
may indicate false claims were submitted to the government, a relator must show and plead
specific and actual instances of false claims to avoid dismissal under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1).
Id. at 1324. In this case the relator's complaint failed to provide specific instances of fraud
and a motion to dismiss the claims by defendant was granted by the trial court and upheld
by the 11th Circuit. Id. at 1325. This ruling potentially creates significant challenges for
future whistleblower-initiated FCA prosecutions of off-label promotion. However, the implications of this ruling were somewhat curtailed by passage of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act in 2009, which extended anti-retaliation protection to whistleblowers. See
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(d), 123 Stat. 1617
(amending 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
118. SeeWang, supra note 117, at 708-12.
119. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation to
Pay $422.5 Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2010/Sept/novartis release.pdf.
120. The Anti-Kickback Statute is a federal statute that prohibits the offering, payment,
solicitation, or receipt of any remuneration in order to induce referrals to another person
or entity for the purpose of furnishing or arranging to furnish any items or service that may
be paid for in whole or in part by a federally funded healthcare program. See Anti-Kickback
Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006). Criminal and civil penalties may apply to violations
of the statute, including treble damages, imprisonment, and exclusion from federally funded healthcare programs. Id.; 42 C.ER. § 1001.952 (2006). A court must find that the accused
individual or entity knowingly and willfully intended to engage in the prohibited action to
impose liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). In addition, a number of safe harbors or exemptions to the Anti-Kickback Statute exist which allow certain transactions or
arrangements within the healthcare setting. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. Such exempted arrangements must precisely meet the terms of safe harbors and are assessed on a case-by-case
basis. See id. Parties may request an advisory opinion from the Office of the Inspector General to help them determine if their proposed arrangement is in violation of the statute. The
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the form of conduct that causes or influences physicians to prescribe off-label such as payment of consulting fees, reimbursements
for travel and entertainment, and various other kinds of payments
made to physicians.
Litigation involving illegal off-label promotion by manufacturers
usually includes both of the above elements, and allows the government to assert both criminal and civil claims. The Novartis
prosecution and the case studies detailed below reflect a sample of
some of these enforcement actions and provide a great deal of information regarding the methods and motivations to promote offlabel use.

B. Case Studies

1. Eli Lilly
The off-label promotion of Zyprexa, a powerful drug used to
treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, is a compelling case study
of both illegal pharmaceutical marketing and government enforcement initiated by FCA qui tam relators. The prosecution of Eli
Lilly involved a violation of the FCA through the implementation
of a misleading marketing campaign that promoted off-label uses.
The controversy surrounded a multiyear advertising campaign
by Eli Lily to promote its new drug, Zyprexa. 2'The campaign,
called "Viva Zyprexa," encouraged sales representatives to suggest
that physicians prescribe the drug for patients, including elderly
patients, suffering from symptoms of dementia-a clearly unapproved indication.'22 This marketing included instructions that
"dementia should be the first message" targeted towards primary
care physicians, and acknowledged that this promotion might lead
to off-label prescribing.' 2 3 The drug also had a black-box warning
from the FDA stating that it increases the risk of death in older patients with dementia-related psychosis. 14 In addition, Eli Lilly
apparently was aware that Zyprexa could cause significant weight
gain and obesity, side effects that could increase the risk of hyper-

Anti-Kickback Statute represents another tool for both federal and state prosecutors in seeking enforcement against fraudulent off-label promotion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). For
further discussion on application of the Anti-Kickback Statute involving off-label promotion
and use, see Craft, supra note 11, at 1132-114.
121. See Craft, supra note 11, at 123.
122. See Berenson, supranote 110.
123. See id.
124. See Zyprexa DrugDescription,supra note 111.
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glycemia and diabetes.'"2 Despite its knowledge of these adverse
risks, Eli Lilly continued to market the drug as "an everyday agent
in primary care.
During this period of off-label promotion, Zyprexa was Eli Lilly's
bestselling drug, prescribed to approximately twenty million patients worldwide, with some $4.2 billion dollars in sales in 2005
alone.'2 The success of the marketing campaign is quantified by
data showing that overall sales of the drug doubled from $1.5 billion
to $3 billion between 1999 and 2002, the period during which the
marketing campaign was active. 28
Eli Lilly's off-label promotion of Zyprexa eventually led to state
and federal investigations in 2005.129 At the conclusion of these investigations, the Department of Justice (DOJ) levied a $1.415
billion fine, including a $515 million dollar criminal fine, which at
that time was the largest fine ever imposed in a healthcare case and
largest criminal fine ever imposed on an individual corporation. *
This enforcement action involved a civil settlement in which the
company admitted that it caused false claims for payment to be
submitted to federal and state insurance programs for off-label uses that were not approved for coverage, a violation of the FCA.' In
addition to the fine, Eli Lilly entered a plea agreement admitting
guilt to a criminal charge of misbranding, entered into civil settlement stating that it submitted false claims to federal insurance
programs, and entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement
(CIA) for a period of five years. 1
125. See Alex Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risks of Top Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2006, at Al.
126. Zosia Kmietowicz, Eli Lily Pays Record Fines of $1.4bn for Promoting Off-Label Use of
Olanzapinefor Common Disorders,338 BMJ 191, 191 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/
content/338/bmj.b2i7.full.
127. Berenson, supra note 110.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
[hereinafter Eli Lilly Press
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html
Release] ("The civil settlement resolves four qui tam actions filed in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania: United States ex rel. Rudolph, v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 03-943
(E.D. Pa.); United States ex rel. Faltaousv. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 06-2909 (E.D.
Pa.); United States ex rel. Woodward v. Dr George B. Jerusalem, Civil Action No. 06-5526 (E.D.
Pa.); and United States ex rel. Vicente v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 07-1791 (E.D.
Pa.). All of those cases were filed by former Eli Lilly sales representatives.").
131. See id.
132. See id. Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) are negotiated agreements imposing
compliance obligations on certain healthcare providers as part of settlements of federal civil
false claim violations and investigations. See Corporate Integrity Agreements, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). These agreements
are negotiated between the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
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These investigations unearthed several aspects Eli Lilly's off-label
promotion effort. Eli Lilly was accused of promoting Zyprexa offlabel for a number of unapproved uses.'3 ' In addition, Eli Lilly actively engaged in wrongful off-label promotion by developing
marketing materials promoting off-label uses, training its sales
force to disregard the law and promote to both the long-term care
market and primary care physicians, and promoting through funding of CME and grants.14

2. Pfizer
In September 2009, the record settlement against Eli Lilly was
eclipsed by a $2.3 billion fine against the pharmaceutical giant
Pfizer, Inc. for its illegal off-label promotion of multiple products. 35
Included in this result was the largest ever healthcare fraud settlement, a guilty plea to a felony violation of the FDCA, and a $1.195
billion criminal fine-the largest ever for any matter."' The settlement included $1 billion to settle false claim allegations to
government payer programs and civil settlements involving kickbacks paid to healthcare providers to promote and prescribe

drugs. 37
Again, this settlement was brought about by whistleblowers acting as qui tam relators under the FCA. These whistleblowers
produced evidence of illegal off-label promotion and shared in a
payment of $102 million. Pfizer was also required to enter into a

Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the healthcare provider to avoid exclusion from
participation in federal healthcare programs. Id. CIAs are generally five years in length and
include requirements such as appointing a compliance officer/committee; development of
compliance standards and policies; implementation of compliance training programs for
employees; independent review of claims submitted for federal healthcare programs; restriction of employment of ineligible persons; active reporting of certain events/overpayments;
establishment of confidential disclosure programs; and providing annual updates and compliance implementation reports to OIG. See id.
133. For example, these included the treatment of dementia, including Alzheimer's
dementia prevalent in the elderly; agitation; aggression; hostility; depression; and generalized sleep disorder. Eli Lilly Press Release, supra note 130.
134. See id.
135. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., justice Dep't Announces
Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in its History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090902a.html.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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CIA requiring annual compliance to certain certifications and requiring greater transparency of marketing.1 39
The landmark settlement detailed Pfizer's systematic off-label
promotion of the sale of Bextra, a painkiller that was withdrawn
from the market in 2005 because of safety concerns." The investigation unearthed a corporate culture that permeated Pfizer's
leadership and sales force, and that actively encouraged illegal offlabel promotion to generate sales, in direct contravention of the
law and with apparent disregard for patient safety. Sales representatives were told to distribute samples to physicians for unapproved
uses at different dosages and carried out marketing plans to influence physicians to prescribe. Employees who questioned off-label
marketing were fired. 142 However, put into context, the recordbreaking fine has been estimated to amount to less than three
weeks of sales at Pfizer.14 3
This was not Pfizer's first illegal off-label promotion case. In
2004, Pfizer subsidiary Warner-Lambert pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of misbranding and agreed to pay more than $430
million to resolve both criminal charges and civil liabilities associated with its anti-seizure drug Neurotin (gabapentin)."A This FCA
qui tam litigation revealed that Warner-Lambert widely promoted
Neurotin off-label for the treatment of epilepsy, various pain syndromes, psychiatric conditions, migraines, and other unapproved
uses through a comprehensive campaign.145 This campaign included marketing and financial support of certain physicians, the
participation in and support of educational programs, and the se146
lective publication and manipulation of medical literature. Pfizer
was also required to enter into a CIA to address these compliance
139. See id. Note that this also includes posting payments made to physicians on its website, a condition now required by law under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
140. See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2009, at B4. Drugs also subject to the enforcement action included Geodon (an antipsychotic), Zyvox (an antibiotic), and Lyrica (used for treatment of neuropathic pain). Id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Rita Rubin, Pfizer Fined $2.3 Billion for Illegal Marketing in Off-Label Drug
Case, USA TODAY (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/
2009-09-02-pfizer-fine N.htm (detailing the story of one Pfizer employee who was fired after
questioning the company's marketing strategy and suing).
143. See Harris, supra note 140.
144. See Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve
Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
145. See id.
146. See Michael Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin:An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 285-90 (2006).
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was subsequently still in place during its settlement
issues, 14which
148
in 2009.
More recently, new allegations against Pfizer have emerged. In
October 2010, a federal court approved a DOJ motion to intervene
in a FCA qui tam lawsuit involving Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of Pfizer, which alleges illegal off-label promotion of the
kidney transplant drug Rapamune. 4' The suit alleges that Wyeth
promoted Rapamune for off-label uses, including liver and lung
transplants and for immunosuppressant therapy, using systematic
marketing campaigns promoting unapproved dosages, uses, and
combinations in violation of the FCA."o The promotion allegedly
included aggressive marketing of unapproved uses and payment of
kickbacks and grants to physicians to encourage off-label prescribing.151 These actions occurred despite "black box" warnings from
the FDA cautioning against using the drug for other transplants
and therapies, including those specifically targeted by Pfizer's mar-

keting.1

2

In addition to the allegations of off-label promotion for unapproved uses, DOJ prosecutors and the House Oversight and
Reform Committee have begun an investigation into whether Wyeth's promotion also specifically targeted certain vulnerable
patient populations, including high-risk African American patients
and patients seeking a second transplant.' 3 This includes the offlabel promotion of transplant drug Rapamune, that had an increase in sales from $169.8 million to $364.8 million from
154
2003-2007. Timing of the litigation is also crucial in relation to
when Wyeth was acquired by Pfizer, as it potentially jeopardizes
Pfizer's status under its current CIA from the 2009 settlement.
3. Other Enforcement Actions
The practice of illegal off-label promotion and marketing is not
limited to a few pharmaceutical manufacturers. Other high-profile
147. See Harris,supra note 140.
148. See Office of Inspector General, Corporate Integrity Agreement (Aug. 31, 2009),
availableat http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/pfizer inc.pdf.
149. Seee Court Approves DOJ Motion to Intervene In Suit Over Pfizer's Marketing of Rapamune,
14 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 837 (Oct. 20, 2010) (discussing United States ex rel.
Sandler v. Wyeth, Civil Action No. 05-6609 (E.D. Pa.)).
150. See id.
151. See Marcia Semmes, New Case FilingAlleges Wyeth Caused Submission of False Claims for
Rapamune, 14 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 450 (June 1, 2010).
152. See supra note 149.
153. See id.
154. See Semmes, supra note 151.
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cases of FCA qui tam litigation and enforcement actions have further confirmed that such illegal promotional activities occur
throughout the industry. In 2005, the Swiss corporation Serono
agreed to pay $704 million in criminal and civil penalties associated with its illegal off-label promotion of the AIDS-wasting drug
Serostim, then the third-largest healthcare-fraud recovery in U.S.
history"'5 In 2007, Purdue Pharma, as well as three of its current
and former executives, also pleaded guilty to criminal charges of
misbranding its prescription painkiller OxyContin, and together
agreed to pay $634.5 million in penalties."6 More recently, in April
2010, AstraZeneca agreed to a civil settlement of $520 million regarding allegations of off-label promotion of its anti-psychotic drug
Seroquel, which involved false claims and illegal kickbacks to physicians who treat vulnerable populations such as pediatric,
adolescent, elderly, and prison patients.1 5 7 There have been several
other recent settlements against drug manufacturers as well.' 5" Together, these settlements highlight both the effectiveness of
whistleblower incentives to report off-label promotion, but also

155. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Serono to Pay $704 Million for the Illegal Marketing of AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/
October/05 civ_545.html.
156. See Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2007, at Al.
157. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Pharm. Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million
for Off-Label Drug Mktg. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
April/10-civ-487.html. Note that this settlement also included a corporate integrity agreement requiring certain certifications and disclosing payments made to physicians on its
website.
158. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay
$600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox, (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html
(discussing the
September 2010 agreement of Allergen Inc. to pay criminal and civil penalties for off-label
Botox promotion); Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Novartis Pharm. Corp. to Pay $422.5 Million
for Off-Label Drug Mktg., (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/pae/
News/Pr/2010/Sept/novartisrelease.pdf (detailing the October 2010 agreement of Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. to pay $422.5 million in criminal and civil fines related to the
promotion of its epilepsy drug Trileptal and five other drugs; this action was also initiated by
whistleblowers); Mary Anne Pazanowski, Stryker Settles Mass. Off-Label Allegations; Criminal
Charges Still Alive in Federal Court, 4 MED. DEVICES L. & INDUS. REP. (BNA) 652 (Sept. 22,
2010) (discussing how in September 2010, Stryker Biotech LLC settled with the state of
Massachusetts for $1.35 million allegations of off-label promotion and misleading healthcare
providers about its products; a federal case under the same facts is still pending). Qui tam
law suits against medical device manufacturers such as Medtronic, Inc. and Abbott Laboratories, as well as DOJ investigations targeting Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific
Corp. for illegal off-label promotion of their products, indicate more robust enforcement of
the medical device industry. See Mary Anne Pazanowski, Lawsuit Accuses Medtronic of Violating
FCA By Off-Label Promotions of Biliary Stents, 4 MED. DEVICES L. & INDUS. REP. (BNA) 178
(Mar. 10, 2010).
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emphasize the pervasiveness of the problem and the failure of current regulations to identify and prevent these activities.
More recently, private insurers have also initiated enforcement
actions against pharmaceutical manufacturers involved in illegal
off-label promotion by engaging in civil litigation designed to recover money lost from use of drugs that were unapproved and
fraudulently marketed.'5 In November 2010, Kaiser Permanente
successfully sued Pfizer in California for illegal off-label promotion
associated with the Neurontin settlement in 2004.60 Kaiser's victory
against the pharmaceutical industry opens the door to future civil
litigation by insurers and other parties for illegal off-label promotion and capitalizes on enforcement actions taken by state and
federal actors.' 6'
At the end of 2010, the DOJ announced that it recovered $2.5
billion in fiscal year 2010 for healthcare fraud civil claims, which
included prosecutions for illegal off-label promotion.12 These enforcement actions illustrate recent enforcement efforts taken by
regulators to combat healthcare fraud and abuse as well as the
scope and pervasiveness of the problem. These efforts also include
the creation of a new interagency task force to increase enforcement called the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement
Action Team (HEAT); a two-year record recovery of $4.6 billion
under the False Claims Act; $3 billion in recoveries under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and twenty-five criminal convictions
against healthcare providers and industry.
However, such recent enforcement results are not sufficient. In
essence, they represent continued reliance upon industry selfpolicing and financial incentives to avoid illegal off-label promotions through fraud and abuse settlements initiated by qui tam
realtors.'6 4 Such a system fails to proactively address illegal off-label
promotion before the fact, which continues to place public health
and the economic viability of the healthcare system at risk.
159. See Evan George, KaiserSays Pfizer DefraudedHMO, L.A. DAILYJ., Feb. 22, 2010.
160. See Emma Gallegos, Health Plans Lead Attack on Drug Makers, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 9,
2010.
161. See id.
162. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Dep't of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False
Claims in Fiscal Year 2010 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/November/10-civ-1335.html (discussing settlements against Pfizer, Inc., AstraZeneca, and Novartis Pharmaceutical group).
163. See id.
164. Whistleblowers may find it more difficult to bring suit against manufacturers after
recent court rulings as well, further undermining any effective regulation in this area. See
Wang, supra note 117, at 708 (discussing the decision in Hopperv. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,
588 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2009), requiring demonstration of intent to market off-label in FCA
qui tam lawsuits).
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POLICY PROPOSALS

A. Reform Considerations

1. Patients
There is a need for appropriate off-label use and promotion,
particularly for vulnerable and orphan-disease patients and their
physicians who have limited access and knowledge of potentially
beneficial treatments. These populations rely heavily upon off-label
uses because of the lack of treatment pathways, the lack of awareness from physicians and patients about optimal clinical options
and appropriate dosing information, and inadequate financial incentives for drug manufacturers to seek additional indications for
these small and underrepresented patient populations. The current system discriminates against these stakeholders, who are swept
up in off-label marketing prohibitions, and creates barriers to effective medical management for these patients while also risking
patient safety by failing to create systemic monitoring of off-label
use.
2. Industry
The limitations of the current regulatory framework fail to address off-label promotion activities by drug companies. The
preceding enforcement case studies suggest that a more proactive
regulatory framework is essential to effectively police inappropriate
marketing. Given that pharmaceutical manufacturers continue to
engage in illegal off-label promotion with attendant risks to patient
safety, a new system of incentives is required to ensure approved
drugs are not promoted by manufacturers for dangerous and
unapproved indications that are unsupported by clinical or evidence-based data. This is especially important for at-risk and
minority populations, which have been subject to unscrupulous,
illegal off-label marketing in the past.1
Simultaneously, the state of off-label regulation requires clarification. With current vague and limited guidance on off-label
promotion, drug companies that desire to responsibly market off
label to vulnerable disease populations are not given systemic FDA
or other guidance. Others take risks and accept multiple prosecutions as a small cost of doing business. Hence, the current system
165.

See Semmes, supra note 151.
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fails to align incentives to promote beneficial off-label marketing
while discouraging dangerous off-label marketing.
3. Government
Efforts to regulate off-label promotion through FDA rulemaking
and guidance have fallen short of what is required to identify and
enforce violations. On the one hand, the FDA lacks both the authority and resources to actively police off-label promotion by
pharmaceutical companies, even though it is widely practiced. On
the other hand, the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry are
faced with ambiguous regulation of off-label promotion due to the
WLFI and WLFII litigation. This ambiguity impedes harmonization in marketing practice and fails to deter illegal activity.
Though qui tam lawsuits have provided some disincentives regarding illegal off-label marketing practices, they do not
adequately protect patient safety because they are reactive, not
proactive. Further, qui tam whistleblowers may be given perverse
incentives to tolerate illegal acts that will result in potentially larger
payments under the FCA. Such settlements inadequately deter future efforts at off-label promotion when the high cost of the FDA
drug approval process outweighs the cost associated with the risk of
enforcement.'" A system that relies upon reactive self-reporting by
industry employees fails to address the ongoing dangers of illegal
off-label promotion for public safety and health.

B. Policy Goals

Based on the current policy limitations, the creation of a proactive system that both identifies and provides incentives for
appropriate off-label promotion will require substantial reform.
This can be accomplished by amending the FDCA to establish a
responsible regulatory framework governing off-label promotion.
Given historical failures of FDA guidance on the subject, past
amendments to the FDCA which address vulnerable populations
(such as the Orphan Drug Act, or the ODA) and the broad scope
and authority of the act, policy promotion of federal legislation
amending the FDCA is the most appropriate course of action to
enhance patient and public health safety. Legislative action can
meet the essential needs of vulnerable patient populations and
166.

See Craft, supra note 11, at 120-21.
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their physicians to obtain information on appropriate off-label
treatment under a safety monitoring system. At the same time, a
system establishing a responsible regulatory framework to review
and assess off-label promotion for all patient populations would
provide regulatory clarity for industry actors, government agencies,
and courts attempting to determine the scope of appropriate offlabel marketing. However, in addition to these carrots, any reform
must also include significant sticks to discourage inappropriate offlabel marketing, particularly for repeat offenders.

C. Proposed Statute

Below, we propose a federal statute to address these concerns.
Statutory reform is desirable because of the relative efficiency of
legislation to achieve social change. 6 The following sections provide the text of the proposed bill and an analysis of each provision.
1. General Provisions and Definitions
A

BILL

H.R.To amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to increase vulnerable and orphan disease patient and physician access to
appropriate drug treatment information, to establish a responsible
regulatory framework to review and assess off-label promotion, to
disincentivize inappropriate off-label drug marketing, and for other purposes.
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This act may be cited as the "Underserved Patient Drug Access
and Pharmaceutical Marketing Responsibility Act."

167. See Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1717, 1737-38 (1982) (noting that legislation is a more efficient and effective method
to achieve social change than common law).
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ENSURE ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE DRUG INFORMATION

BY UNDERSERVED PATIENTS AND THEIR PHYSICIANS.

(a) Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360ccc2.) is amended by inserting after section 528 the following:
"SEC. 529. FDA APPROVED MARKETING PROGRAM TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DRUG INFORMATION FOR ORPHAN
DISEASE AND OTHER VULNERABLE PATIENTS."

"(a) Findings.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Medicines provide significant benefits to the
citizens of this country.
(2) However, patients with rare diseases and other
vulnerable patients who have not been
included in clinical trials often have no FDAapproved drugs to treat them and their
condition.
(3) FDA-approved drugs for other disease treatments have been found to appropriately treat
these rare disease and vulnerable patients, but
cannot be advertised to patients because of the
prohibition against manufacturer marketing of
unapproved drug uses, known as off-label marketing.
(4) Consequently, these patients and their physicians are uninformed regarding these effective
treatments.
(5) Further, advancement of medical knowledge
regarding these drugs and these patients is limited because of the low return on investment
for manufacturers to obtain FDA approval for
these conditions.
(6) However, off-label marketing by drug manufacturers has resulted in safety concerns and
prosecutions, but continues despite civil and
criminal fines and penalties."
"(b) Definitions.-In this section:
(1) Commissioner.-The term 'Commissioner'
means the Food and Drug Administration
Commissioner.
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Secretary.-The term 'Secretary' means the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
(3) Vulnerable Patient Populations.-The term
'vulnerable patient populations' means patients with limited FDA-approved drug
treatment for their specific population or disease, including patients such as pediatric
populations, pregnant women, orphan and rare disease patients."
The bill's preamble and Sections 1 and 2 provide the basis and
rationale of the Act, and notes that it will amend the FDCA. Section 2 of the proposed bill introduces new FDCA Section 529.
Subsection (a) discusses the key aspects of the problem of vulnerable patient access to appropriate, but off-label, pharmaceutical
treatment and limited knowledge dissemination to these patients
and their physicians due to the ban on off-label marketing. It also
notes that there have been abuses by drug companies through offlabel marketing. Definitions for the forthcoming substantive sections are given in subsection (b) to provide clarity in
understanding the scope of the new provisions.
(2)

2. Approved Off-label Marketing Program for
Vulnerable Populations
Providing information for physicians and patients on unapproved efficacious drug treatments and emerging off-label clinical
interventions for vulnerable patient populations is a need that can
be addressed by controlled and monitored use of off-label promotion. To accomplish this goal, a system designed to offer flexibility
in approving direct off-label promotion by manufacturers for vulnerable patient populations should be employed.
The FDA's permitting of off-label promotion for certain vulnerable patient populations would be the first step towards such a
system. Under the new system, manufacturers would apply for
FDA authorization to promote such off-label indications directly to
physicians through an application form similar to the request for
orphan designation under the Orphan Drug Act.m
168. See Liang & Mackey, supra note 59, at 273.
169. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The Orphan Drug Act provides
manufacturers the opportunity to submit drug applications for orphan drug indications. If
approved, manufacturers may be eligible for certain incentives including: (a) 7-year market
exclusivity; (b) tax credits for clinical trial costs; (c) federal grants to support clinical testing
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"(c) Permitted off-label promotion.(1) Listing of vulnerable patient populations.The Commissioner shall create a list of
vulnerable patient populations as defined in
this Act.
(2) Updating vulnerable patient populations.The Commissioner shall periodically, but no
less often than annually, review and update the
list of vulnerable patient populations.
(3) Applicability to vulnerable patient populations.-The provisions of this section shall be
applicable only to vulnerable patient population off-label promotion efforts.
(4) Creation of Approved Off-Label Marketing
Program.-The Secretary shall direct the
Commissioner to(A) create an Approved Off-Label Marketing
Program for drug companies who wish to
market to vulnerable patient populations.
(B) issue regulations announcing and implementing the Approved Off-Label Marketing
Program within 180 days of the passage of
this Act.
(C) create as part of the Approved Off-Label
Marketing Program regulations an application process for drug manufacturerapproved off-label marketing for vulnerable
disease populations, which shall include, at a
minimum, submission by the drug manufacturer of:
(i) details on the vulnerable patient population and disease to be treated;
(ii) a description of the drug proposed for
the approved off-label marketing;
(iii) documentation of the vulnerable patient
population and disease prevalence;

of rare disease treatments; (d) exemption from FDA user fees; and (e) expedited review. Id.;
Liang & Mackey, supra note 59, at 273-74. The purpose of the Act is to incentivize manufacturers to conduct drug development for indications and treatments that might not
otherwise be profitable. See Orphan Drug Act § 1(b).

FALL

2011]

Off-Label Promotion Reform

(iv) the regulatory and marketing status and
history of the product;
(v) any post-market safety or efficacy data
concerning the use of the drug for the
vulnerable patient population and indication;
(vi) the specific promotional literature and
materials, including Internet materials, to
be disseminated to physicians for FDA review and approval;
(vii) risk management and pharmacovigilance
plans for monitoring and reporting of offlabel use, adverse events, other safety
concerns, and other events relevant to the
clinical treatment and health of the vulnerable patient population, and an
affirmation of adequate funds to underwrite these plans;
(viii) any other information that the Commissioner or his/her designee requires; and
(ix) an attestation that all promotion would
not be false, misleading, and that all materials would be peer-reviewed and
approved by the FDA prior to dissemination.
(D) create an Off-Label Marketing Advisory
Committee for Vulnerable Patients, under
the terms and conditions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-16,
which shall be comprised of scientific,
communications, marketing, health literacy,
and other experts, who have specific expertise with vulnerable patient populations.
(i) Responsibilities of the FDA Off-Label Marketing Advisory Committee for Vulnerable
Patients.-The Off-Label Marketing Advisory Committee for Vulnerable Patients
shall assess and evaluate the accuracy, appropriateness, and nature of proposed
drug company off-label marketing materials, and make recommendations to the
Commissioner as to the desirability of
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allowing the proposed off-label marketing,
specifically focusing on any implications
for vulnerable patient populations.
(ii) Additional review.-The Off-Label Marketing Review Committee shall also
review, as appropriate, applicable literature and other information on the subject
beyond that submitted for the proposed
off-label marketing and consult with external experts to determine, at a
minimum, if:
(A) the available literature on the subject was
reliable and reasonably supported that
the off-label use is safe and effective, with
particular reference to vulnerable patient
populations;
(B) the available literature on the subject was
reliable and did not support the off-label
promotion proposal, with particular reference to vulnerable patient populations;
or
(C) there was inadequate information to support the proposed off-label promotion or
that there was enough adverse data (including post-marketing data) about the
pharmaceutical that a supplemental new
drug application is required to support
any promotion of off-label uses, with particular reference to vulnerable patient
populations.
(E) Application rejection.-An application
may be rejected or additional information/data may be requested from the
drug manufacturer if the Commissioner
or the Commissioner's designee has determined that the risk versus benefit to
patients or supporting evidence is not sufficient to allow for the off-label
promotion of the drug for the proposed
vulnerable patient population."
This section creates the new Approved Off-Label Marketing
Program (the Program). It expressly notes that the Program only
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applies to vulnerable patient populations, and that the FDA Commissioner must revisit this categorization at least annually to
account for changes in the makeup of these populations. It also
presents the basic terms of the Program, including the need for
the FDA to create an application process that includes specific disclosures about the targeted vulnerable disease population, the
makeup of the drug and its regulatory history, the drug's safety
profile, the proposed marketing literature (including Internet materials), a risk management plan, and attestations that no
inappropriate off-label marketing will occur and that all materials
are peer-reviewed and FDA-approved. Importantly, the requirements in this Section create an FDA Advisory Committee, the
Off-Label Marketing Advisory Committee for Vulnerable Patients,
with appropriate expertise to review applications. FDA Advisory
Committees play an important role in supporting the agency by
providing independent, expert advice that improves the quality of
regulatory decisions made by the FDA.o7 0 The section also notes
that the FDA may reject any drug manufacturer's applications.
Additionally, manufacturers would be required to submit a risk
management and pharmacovigilance plan to collect, detect, and
report adverse events associated with approved off-label use. Such a
strategy, which has been employed in Europe and applied to complex drugs with limited adverse event profiles such as follow-on
biologics,' 7 1 can provide rapid information on unanticipated adverse drug events and promote patient safety while also providing
information on drug effects in understudied populations. Manufacturers would be responsible for implementing the approved risk
management and pharmacovigilance plan to detect these adverse
events. 172

170. See Advisory Committees: Criticalto the FDA's ProductReview Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43538.htm (last
updated Aug. 12, 2011).
171. See Bryan A. Liang, RegulatingFollow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGISL. 363, 420,
423-24 (2007) (discussing risk management and pharmacovigilance efforts in the EU for
new "biosimilar" copies of complex biological molecules on patient populations).
172. The FDA could fund this initiative through user fees for FDA review and approval of direct off-label promotion under this scheme. This amount could be set as other
FDA user fees are set. See generally PrescriptionDrug UserFeeAct (PDUFA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/default.htm

(last updated Aug. 31, 2011) (PDUFA authorizes FDA to collect fees from companies who
produce drugs and could be further authorized to collect application fees for a program to
consider approval of off-label indications).
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3. Limited Enrollment and Required Registration
As a safety matter, because of the lack of full clinical trials and
limited knowledge of the drug's complete impact on vulnerable
patient populations, it is essential that only a limited group of patients participate initially. Further, to ensure that information is
being collected and safety issues are being addressed, a registration
program as part of the Program's surveillance and monitoring requirements should also be implemented. These latter components
will also provide data and build a knowledge set regarding the approved off-label use in the specific vulnerable patient population.
"(F) Limited applicability.-Any application for
approved off-label marketing shall be limited by the Commissioner to a fraction of
the vulnerable patient population under
conditions as defined by the Commissioner based upon the vulnerable patient
population characteristics, peer reviewed
publications, and other information.
(i) Monitoring responsibility.-The drug
manufacturer that has obtained approval for a drug under the Approved
Off-Label Marketing Program shall
be responsible for monitoring the
limits of vulnerable patient populations and ensuring that they are not
exceeded.
(ii) Fraction exceeded.-If a drug company that has an application in the
Approved Off-Label Marketing Program exceeds that as set by the
Commissioner, the FDA approval of
drug company off-label marketing in
the Approved Off-Label Marketing
Program may be withdrawn, and the
drug company may be directed by the
Commissioner to apply for a supplemental new drug application under
provisions of 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 for
supplemental New Drug Applications. The Commissioner shall have
discretion in any withdrawal action.
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(G) Registration.-Any drug company, vulnerable patient population patient who accesses
the approved off-label marketing drug, and
his or her physician, must register with the
FDA and provide clinical information and
updates on the treatment experience with
the approved off-label marketing drug. The
terms and conditions shall be based upon
the risk profile, peer reviewed evidence, and
other information."
Here, for safety purposes, approved off-label promotion would
be limited to a fraction of the applicable diseases population. This
is similar to the threshold for FDA Humanitarian Device Exemptions, which promotes the development of medical devices for rare
diseases.17 Further, each physician and patient under the Program
would be required to register with the FDA, similar to the process
of restricted distribution and patient/provider registration for
high-risk drugs. 174
If off-label prescribing exceeded this threshold, the manufacturer would be required to file a sNDA in order to continue any direct
form of off-label promotion. Monitoring off-label prescribing to
ensure that the threshold is not exceeded would be the responsibility of the manufacturer; this could be accomplished through
active monitoring of physician prescribing practices. The FDA
Commissioner would have discretion when the fraction of vulnerable patient population is exceeded to order a sNDA.
4. Clarifying Permitted Off-Label Marketing
While a regulatory framework to encourage positive and needed
forms of direct off-label promotion for underserved populations is
crucial, regulating inappropriate forms of off-label promotion is
equally important. This effort could be accomplished by requiring
173. See HumanitarianDevice Exemption, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premarket
Submissions/HumanitarianDeviceExemption/default.htm (last updated Aug. 30, 2010).
174. See, e.g., Robert Shin et al., Natalizumab (Tysabri@) and VA HealthcareProviders, U.S.
DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/MS/articles/Natalizumab-Tysabri-andVA
HealthcareProviders.asp (last reviewed Dec. 11, 2009). This describes the registration program for Natalizumab, which is a high-risk drug. Requirements in the program include: all
patients must be registered and give informed consent; all providers and patients must agree to
follow-up evaluations; only registered providers can prescribe the monthly intravenous infusion
drug; only registered infusion centers can administer natalizumab; only registered pharmacies
can distribute natalizumab; and only enrolled patients enrolled can receive treatment.
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all off-label promotion and marketing not associated with vulnerable patient populations to be reviewed and approved by the FDA
though a clear policy aimed at assessing whether information is
misleading, false, or misbranded.
This could be accomplished by implementing an Advisory
Committee for this purpose similar to the Program, by which an
off-label marketing review committee would review and provide
recommendations to the Commissioner for any proposed off-label
promotion.
SECTION

FDA

3. To

CLARIFY PERMITTED OFF-LABEL PROMOTION BY AN

ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

"SEC.

(a) Chapter III of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360ccc2) is amended by inserting
after section 301 the following:
301A. CREATION OF AN FDA OFF-LABEL PROMOTION ADVI-

SORY COMMITTEE."

"(a) Commissioner may approve drug company off-label
marketing.-Subject to the provisions of this Section, the Commissioner is empowered to approve
drug company off-label marketing, superseding any
other provisions to the contrary.
(b) FDA Off-Label Promotion Advisory Committee.The Commissioner shall create an FDA Off-Label
Promotion Advisory Committee, under the terms
and conditions of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, comprised of scientific, communications, marketing, health literacy, and other
experts, to review proposed drug company off-label
marketing, subject to subparagraph (b) (1).
(1) Non-applicability to Approved Off-Label Marketing Program.-The provisions of this
Section are inapplicable to off-label marketing
materials submitted under the Approved OffLabel Marketing Program, Section 529 of this
Act.
(c) Industry application.-Drug manufacturers who
wish to engage in off-label marketing, other than
that for vulnerable disease populations under Section 529, must obtain approval from the FDA under
this Section before initiating such activities. To have
its materials reviewed for potential approval, a drug
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manufacturer shall submit materials as required by
the Commissioner to assess the drug company's
proposed off-label marketing materials, including,
at a minimum:
(1) studies that support and, as relevant, do not
support the off-label use, including identification of the drug, proposed patient populations,
regulatory and marketing history, and postmarket safety/efficacy data;
(2) Internet materials;
(3) brochures and pamphlets;
(4) all other marketing materials;
(5) risk management and pharmacovigilance
plans, and an affirmation of adequate funds to
underwrite these plans;
(6) any other information required by the Commissioner; and
(7) an attestation that all materials relevant to the
proposed off-label promotion are included,
that all promotion would not be false, misleading, and that all materials would be peerreviewed and approved by the FDA prior to
dissemination, prior to any use of any of the
proposed off-label marketing materials.
(d) Responsibilities of the FDA Off-Label Promotion
Advisory Committee.-The Off-Label Promotion
Advisory Committee shall assess and evaluate the
accuracy, appropriateness, and nature of proposed
drug company off-label marketing materials, and
make recommendations to the Commissioner as to
the desirability of allowing the proposed off-label
marketing.
(1) Additional review.-The Off-Label Promotion
Advisory Committee shall also review, as appropriate, applicable literature and other
information on the subject and consult with
external experts to determine, at a minimum,
if:

(A) the available literature on the subject was
reliable and reasonably supported that the
off-label use is safe and effective;
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(B) the available literature on the subject was reliable and did not support the off-label
promotion proposal; or
(C) there was inadequate information to support
the proposed off-label promotion or that
there was enough adverse data (including
post-marketing data) about the pharmaceutical that a supplemental new drug application
is required to support any promotion of offlabel uses."
Enrollment limits.-The Commissioner may, on the
basis of an application, Off-Label Promotion Advisory Committee recommendations, and other
relevant materials, limit the number of patients who
may participate under this off-label promotion approval.
(1) Monitoring responsibility.-The drug manufacturer that has obtained approval for
off-label promotion under this Section shall be
responsible for monitoring the limits of patient populations are not exceeded if imposed
by the Commissioner.
(2) Fraction exceeded.-If a drug company exceeds that fraction of patients set by the
Commissioner, the FDA approval for off-label
promotion may be withdrawn, and the drug
company may be directed by the Commissioner to apply for a supplemental new drug
application under provisions of the 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70 for supplemental New Drug Application. The Commissioner shall have discretion
in any withdrawal action.
Registration.-If the Commissioner creates enrollment limits under subsection (e) of this Section,
drug companies that have approved off-label promotion, patient who accesses the promoted drug,
and his or her physician must register with the FDA
and provide clinical information and updates on
the treatment experience with the off-label promoted drug. The terms and conditions shall be based
upon the risk profile, peer-reviewed evidence, and
other information."
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In this situation, like other FDA Advisory Committees, the OffLabel Promotion Advisory Committee would employ technical and
nontechnical talent to evaluate the issue at hand: here, the accuracy, appropriateness, and scientific support of off-label drug uses
and its marketing proposed by drug companies.1 " In particular, the
application for approval of off-label promotion by manufacturers
would require submission of any supporting and non-supporting
studies regarding the proposed off-label marketing. Furthermore,
a safety provision that permits unilateral limits on off-label promotion and use by the FDA Commissioner, as well as registration
requirements that are similar to the Program, can protect patients
while also generating useful data regarding off-label drug uses and
outcomes.
5. Authorized Off-Label Promotion Practices
Approval of a manufacturer's ability to promote off-label use for
both vulnerable patient populations and other patient populations
would also be conditioned on the manufacturer's adherence to
certain "authorized off-label marketing practices" as prescribed by
the FDA. This is to ensure that off-label promotions would be
standardized in such a way that they would be easily recognizable
to physicians and patients.
"(g) Authorized off-label promotion practices.-The
Commissioner shall create authorized off-label promotion practices for any approved off-label
marketing under this Section and Section 529. At a
minimum, such authorized off-label marketing practices shall include:
(1) only promoting the off-label use using approved promotional activities as determined by
the FDA;
(2) only disseminating scientific literature that has
met FDA criteria for approved promotional
materials;

175. To mitigate potential conflicts of interest, the FDA revised its policies and procedures for its Advisory Committees to screen for financial conflicts of interest and has
adopted rules and procedures to ensure integrity in the decision-making process. See Fact
Sheet: Improved Policies and Procedures Regarding Transparency, Public Disclosure for FDA
Advisory Committees, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/
factsheet080408.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
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actively engaging in surveillance and monitoring of the off-label use and periodically
reporting to the FDA quality and safety data
under its risk management and pharmacovigilence plan; and
(4) including specific labeling on the drugs that
they have not been FDA-approved for the offlabel use and patients should consult their
physicians for more information."
However, beyond the importance of clearly defining approved
off-label promoted drugs, whether for vulnerable or other patient
populations, there must be penalties for off-label marketing violations. The proposed bill would provide clear guidance to drug
companies as to appropriate off-label marketing. Hence, any other
off-label marketing would be deemed illegal and penalized as fraud
and abuse.
"(h) Penalties for unapproved off-label marketing.(1) Any other marketing of drugs by drug companies, their assigns, or representatives, disclosed
or undisclosed, shall be prohibited unless in
comport with this Act.
(2) Any other marketing of drugs by drug companies, their assigns, or representatives, disclosed
or undisclosed, shall be deemed misbranding
of drugs.
(3) Any other marketing of drugs by drug companies, their assigns, or representatives, disclosed
or undisclosed, that is submitted for, or results
in payment by a public healthcare program
shall be deemed a false claim, under the False
(3)

Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
(4) Any other marketing of drugs by drug companies, their assigns, or representatives, disclosed
or undisclosed, shall be deemed a kickback
under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) if payment of any remuneration
for referral to the drug result.
(5) If a drug company engages in off-label marketing in violation of this Act greater than one
time, that company shall be ineligible for parOff-Label
the Approved
ticipation
in
Marketing Program under Section 529 of this
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Act and the approved off-label promotion under this Section.
(6) Section 1128(A) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) is amended by adding after
§ 1320a-7 (a) (4) the following:
'(5) Conviction of Illegal Off-Label Marketing.Any individual or entity that has been convicted of illegal off-label marketing related to the
delivery of any drug subchapter XVIII of this
chapter or under any State healthcare program.'
(7) Nothing in this Act shall limit causes of action or
prosecutions for unapproved off-label marketing in
federal or state venues against any drug company or
individual."
Any off-label promotion outside the context of the statute would
create significant risks for drug companies. By providing clear definitions of appropriate off-label promotion, the statute gives drug
companies significant guidance about permitted marketing. However, to discourage drug companies from engaging in unapproved
off-label marketing, the statute deems off-label marketing outside
its framework a misbranding of drugs, a false claim, and a potential
kickback. Courts would easily distinguish permitted and prohibited
off-label marketing and, using the statutory provisions, deem such
actions as fraud and abuse.
Beyond the FCA and potential Anti-Kickback Statute prosecutions, drug companies that violate the statute would also be barred
from engaging in any future off-label marketing. The new benefits
granted by the statute to companies engaging in appropriate offlabel marketing would therefore be eliminated for companies
found to have violated the statute, multiplying the penalties for
inappropriate marketing strategies. Furthermore, the amendment
to the Social Security Act would permit mandatory exclusion of
convicted companies from participation in public health programs,
including Medicare. 1 6 Finally, to ensure novel and appropriate
penalties are still available against the recalcitrant off-label offender, the provisions of the bill provide expressly that additional
prosecutions against individual corporate officers of firms engaged
in illegal off-label marketing would not be preempted. This will be
a powerful tool for regulators because of the lack of a scienter
176. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006) (outlining criminal monetary penalties for
acts involving federal health care programs that could include possible disbarment).
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requirement to impose penalties on corporate executives and the
prohibition of any public program payments to entities that
employ excluded persons."' Through this series of nonexclusive
penalties, appropriate deterrence, particularly of repeat offenders,
may be accomplished.
V. POLICY BENEFITS
A. FDA

This approach, beyond improving access and information for
vulnerable patient populations and their providers, would enable
the FDA to more efficiently identify pharmaceutical products that
would benefit from further testing. This builds on efforts to establish an orphan drug database and to encourage manufacturers to
conduct clinical trials and seek approval for additional indications,
including indications for rare diseases.7 8 The FDA could even provide grant funding, similar to the grants provided under the
Orphan Drug Act, for clinical research of promising drugs with
acceptably low risk profiles for further efficacy testing for the vulnerable patient population and promotion of clinical indication.
This process would promote the development of a knowledge
base on off-label uses of such drugs. The mandatory risk management and pharmacovigilance, as well as the prescribing limit and
reporting requirements, also provide some assurance that off-label
uses would be properly studied and monitored. The resulting data
set could be a basis for an FDA assessment of warnings and limitations associated with these drugs and for additional study.
This process would also increase the FDA's situational awareness
of off-label drug use and promotion for vulnerable patient popula177. See, e.g., Anna Edney, Drug-Firm Executives Under New Scrutiny in Medicare Fraud,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 2010, at Al5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/11/08/AR2010110805757.html (discussing the potential prosecution
of drug company executives and potential for companies employing such individuals to lose
federal reimbursements); Memorandum Report from Stuart Wright, Deputy Inspector Gen.
for Evaluation and Inspections to Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm'r and Chief Operating
Officer, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (May 19, 2010), available at http://oig.hhs.
gov/oei/reports/oei-09-08-00330.pdf; see also John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Convey, Defending Against Food & Drug Prosecutions, 21 CHAMPION 20, 22 (1997), available at http://
www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97jul02.htm ("[I]n providing sanctions which
reach corporate agents, the [Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 'FDCA'] imposes upon persons
exercising authority or supervisory authority not only a positive duty to remedy FDCA violations as they occur, but also a duty to implement policies and practices designed to insure
against future violations.").
178. See Marcus, supra note 65 (describing the FDA's efforts to "repurpose" approved
drugs through the creation of an orphan disease database).
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tions, while also mandating manufacturer responsibility for monitoring and managing potential adverse events. The FDA could
then more proactively remove drugs from the market or require
additional testing in a much more nimble way than is currently
possible.
By implementing the statute through FDA advisory committees,
regulators could better fulfill their mandate to actively monitor
and assess off-label promotional activities. At the same time, this
method also provides clarity to drug manufacturers regarding acceptable off-label promotion. By centralizing review and decision
making within these structures, this reform provides the FDA with
a full spectrum of oversight for off-label promotion practices while
at the same time providing concrete processes to assess their scientific validity.
This method of implementation would also harmonize legitimate practices of off-label promotion by encouraging adherence to
authorized off-label practices, such as appropriate use of scientific
literature, post-market surveillance and pharmacovigilance efforts,
and adherence to labeling requirements to better inform patients.
Using this multi-tiered approach, the FDA would ensure that approvals of off-label marketing included benefits for patient safety
and increased transparency, with extension to off-label uses supported by reliable evidence-based literature. Further, by
empowering the FDA to reassess and withdraw approval of off-label
promotion, this system would create a dynamic post-market surveillance regime to collect patient safety data on off-label uses
common in medical practice.
In addition, enforcement mechanisms available under this policy would enable active identification and enforcement against
illegal off-label promotion that fall outside of the parameters of
acceptable practices. This enforcement framework also puts manufacturers on notice regarding the severity of penalties for
continued illegal off-label promotion activities. Furthermore, extending additional penalties beyond misbranding to fraud and
abuse would enable the FDA to coordinate enforcement action
against rogue manufacturers and their individual officers and directors. Enforcement could be more efficiently initiated against
actors who engaged in illegal off-label promotion before approval
of an application, after application denial, or after approval has
been revoked. Such a stringent penalty set would encourage
voluntary adherence to responsible off-label promotion as adopted
and continuously monitored by the FDA.
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B. Patients and Physicians

Allowing for this regulated form of limited off-label promotion
can, importantly, address physician knowledge limitations about
the range of treatment options available to vulnerable patient
populations. Of course, the opportunity for patients to understand
the clinical options available to them is also an important benefit.
This information will allow for more informed decisions by patients and increased adoption of advances in clinical treatment by
physicians, while also providing transparency of their off-label status. This outcome is especially important given that only
approximately 300 approvals for orphan disease indications have
been given since enactment of the ODA out of an identified 6800
rare diseases, and that physicians generally lack knowledge about

orphan disease treatments.179
Further, the system would broaden the spectrum of safety and
efficacy information for off-label prescribing through mandates for
a risk management and post-market surveillance system, while also
ensuring that physicians are provided only scientific literature that
has been vetted and approved by the FDA. Patients would gain
greater access to innovative clinical treatments that would otherwise take years to gain FDA approval, and physicians would be
armed with a growing body of safety and efficacy information to
help guide them in their decisions to prescribe off-label. Both patients and physicians would benefit from increased enforcement
mechanisms that would make it more difficult for bad actors to engage in illegal off-label promotion that had not been subject to
FDA regulatory review. Indeed, standardization of approved offlabel marketing practices would also serve to inform patients and
physicians as to appropriate, approved off-label promotion.

C. Manufacturers

Drug manufacturers also benefit from the provisions of the proposed statute. These reforms clarify the requirements and limits of
off-label promotion, the benefits to the responsible manufacturer,
and the penalties for the bad actor. Practically speaking, the reforms provide manufacturers with a set of clear off-label promotion
policies and procedures while also creating incentives for manufacturers to develop databases of safe and effective off-label uses.
Manufacturers would be encouraged to explore additional re179.

See Liang & Mackey, supranote 59, at 273.
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search of off-label uses to support potential future sNDAs and even
full approval. They may also limit potential future off-label liability
by acting in a responsible and guided manner.
Importantly, the proposed bill would lower the cost barrier faced
by pharmaceutical companies to investing in treatments for vulnerable patient populations, which may otherwise have been
deemed an unprofitable effort. The gained experience with these
populations in the context of post-market surveillance and other
activities will provide a clear picture of the potential for further
efforts with the specific drug, the specific vulnerable patient population, or both. It would also provide production and distribution
cost information that may identify potential profitable drugs without having to endure full FDA marketing approval or a sNDA. This
may lead companies to consider either sNDA or full FDA marketing approval that heretofore they would not have considered.
Responsible manufacturers would also be at a competitive advantage. Those who participate in the proposed system may obtain
data more quickly and can move towards vulnerable patient population markets that have not yet been entered. Further, exclusivity
incentives can work in concert with this approach. For example,
manufacturers with unapproved drugs could take advantage of
ODA incentives to develop approved drugs for the orphan indication and then identify and develop other vulnerable patient
population markets using the off-label system. This would maximize returns for promising drugs, which is particularly needed for
the small companies who often develop these drugs. Indeed, as a
general matter, this could also lead to increased competition and
lower costs by facilitating market entry of additional manufacturers
without the need for exclusivity incentives like the ODA's.'8 o
Reimbursements for drugs may also be enhanced. Off-label
promotion and information sharing for vulnerable patient populations may also increase the chances of off-label federal and state
reimbursement approval. This would lead to both increased patient access as well as increased revenues for manufacturers as
these forms of treatments become common and accepted as valid
methods of treatment, similar to recent Medicare action on particular cancer drugs."'

180. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (listing ODA provisions including
exclusivity benefits and clinical trial support for FDA-designated orphan drugs).
181. See Reed Abelson & Andrew Pollack, Medicare Widens Drugs It Accepts for Cancer, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at Al (discussing the impact of Medicare expanding coverage to include cancer treatments not yet approved by the FDA).
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CONCLUSION

Off-label marketing creates both risks and opportunities for
health policy and patient care. It is abundantly clear that off-label
marketing by unscrupulous entities creates risks to public health
and patient safety that have not been adequately addressed. Yet,
prohibiting all off-label marketing creates its own problems. For
example, vulnerable patient populations and their physicians are
left unaware of appropriate off-label treatment. Hence, current
regulatory rules are either overinclusive, because they create information vacuums for vulnerable patient populations and their
physicians, or are underinclusive because of the continued and
repeat violations of off-label prohibitions. Reform is needed.
Using a legislative approach to address the information gap of
vulnerable patient populations and penalizing repeat offenders in
off-label promotion can address these concerns. This approach
provides an important comprehensive solution to the multi-faceted
issue of off-label promotion. This will eliminate the overinclusive
nature of off-label marketing to improve information flow to patients and also addresses the underinclusive nature of current
regulatory limitations that place patients and public health at risk.
Such a comprehensive policy solution will allow benefits to inure to
patients, the government and manufacturers through sharing of
common benefits.
To ensure that the benefits associated with pharmaceuticals are
fully realized, information on their usefulness must be appropriately disseminated but not mischaracterized. Through a coordinated
approach, agencies such as the FDA can be empowered to provide
relevant and evidence-based review, responsible manufacturers can
be encouraged to provide information and promote clinical indications appropriately, and poorly-acting entities can be penalized
and eliminated from off-label activities. Such a process can advance
health and healthcare access to the individual patient while fulfilling the important social goals of patient safety, public health,
and potential expansion of innovation.

